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Following the 9/11 terror attacks, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was 
mandated to ensure the security of the nation’s cyber-supported critical infrastructure, 
which is predominantly privately owned and outside of the control of the U.S. 
government. This thesis examines the development of the government’s cyber-security 
policies and primary operational entities through their lawful authorities and capabilities. 
The thesis also examines and contrasts the effectiveness of DHS’s technology-centric, 
cyber-security approach, the deterrent effect realized through law enforcement cyber 
operations, and the suitability and effectiveness of the utilization of military or 
intelligence agencies, specifically the FBI, National Security Agency or Department of 
Defense, to fulfill the nation’s domestic cyber-security mission.   
Evidence suggests that DHS has consistently chosen to devote disproportionate 
budgetary resources to develop defensive technologies of questionable effectiveness, 
initiate redundant information-sharing programs, and develop cyber incidence response 
teams while not fully utilizing the U.S. Secret Service’s legal authorities and capabilities 
in furtherance of the department’s mission. 
Recommendations are offered to develop a whole-of-government cyber-security 
policy for an effective, integrated, cyber-security operation through the utilization of 
agency-specific authorities and capabilities, while protecting our nation’s critical 
infrastructure and our citizens’ civil liberties. 
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Since the initial development of the Internet as an information-sharing platform, the 
cyber world has grown exponentially and become intertwined with almost every facet of 
our daily activities, commerce, and governmental operations. But, increasingly, the 
opportunities offered by the cyber world have resulted in rapidly increasing threats to our 
citizens, businesses and government operations.  
Cyber security and cyber law enforcement operations were recognized as rapidly 
growing fields when the nation suffered the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 
Following the attacks, the U.S. government worked to reassure the American public, 
mitigate previously unidentified threats, and provide for citizens’ safety and security. 
During this time, many organizational changes were made to facilitate increased security 
and operational efficiency. Among the most significant was the creation of the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with the passage of Public Law 107–296 
(Homeland Security Act of 2002) on November 25, 2002. 
On September 11, 2001, the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) was operationally 
aligned within the U.S. Treasury Department with the authorities conferred since its 
formation in 1865 to suppress the counterfeiting of U.S. currency. The USSS has 
continued to develop its investigative expertise as the primary investigative agency 
defending the nation’s financial infrastructure through financial crimes investigations. 
Over the course of its history, the Secret Service’s investigative authorities evolved, and 
the agency adapted its capabilities to account for changing technologies that supported 
the nation’s critical financial infrastructure. As the financial sector became increasingly 
reliant on cyber technologies, and the threats emanating from cyberspace became more 
pervasive, the USSS also consistently increased its investment in cyber-investigative 
capabilities. The USA Patriot Act, which passed on October 26, 2001, called for an 
expansion of the USSS Electronic Crime Task Force (ECTF) model, which had been 
proven to be a successful method of investigating the terrorist use of cyber technologies 
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and the prevention of attacks against the nation’s financial infrastructure through 
aggressive enforcement and information sharing.1  
In 2003, the USSS, although mandated to remain a distinct agency operating 
within its own authorities, was transferred to the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), whose mission was to ensure the security of the nation from terrorist attack.2 
Since that time, DHS’s mission has expanded to include the security and resilience of the 
nation’s 16 Critical Infrastructure And Key Resources (CIKR), which includes the 
financial infrastructure and cyberspace.3 DHS’s National Protection and Programs 
Directorate (NPPD) was formed to coordinate the department’s cyber-security mission 
but, as reflected in multiple governmental reports, NPPD has underutilized DHS 
component cyber-security capabilities, namely the USSS cyber investigation expertise, to 
further the department’s cyber-security mission.4  
This thesis documents the U.S. government’s post-9/11 initial focus on the threat 
posed by international terrorism to its shifting focus on the nation’s resiliency, and 
finally, to cyber-based threats that could impact the nation’s identified critical 
infrastructure. It examines the Department of Homeland Security as it followed the 
identical development process, as well as the operations and development of the primary 
cyber law enforcement, military and intelligence agencies supporting this cyber security 
effort.  
Research questions were developed to guide this research and, ultimately, provide 
recommendations to assist the U.S. government in developing a comprehensive national 
cyber security methodology and policies that utilize agency-specific lawful authorities 
1 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
2 An Act to Establish the Department of Homeland Security, and for Other Purposes (Homeland 
Security Act) Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296 Stat. 2135 (2002). 
3 U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 
(Washington, DC: DHS, 2009) https://www.dhs.gov/national-infrastructure-protection-plan. 
4 Frank Deffer, Planning, Management, and Systems Issues Hinder DHS’ Efforts To Protect 
Cyberspace and the Nation’s Cyber Infrastructure (OIG -11-89) (Washington, DC: OIG and DHS, June 
2011), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=683172. 
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and capabilities to strengthen our cyber security efforts while protecting our citizens’ 
civil liberties and privacy.  
• Primary research question:  What strategies can the U.S. government 
develop that support the efforts of DHS, in concert with other 
governmental cyber security entities, to ensure the nation’s cyber-
supported critical infrastructure is provided with the most comprehensive 
security, while ensuring our citizens’ privacy and security are preserved? 
• Secondary research question: How could the application of established 
law enforcement investigative authorities and capabilities augment the 
technology-centric, defensive cyber methods currently utilized by the 
Department of Homeland Security to secure the nation’s critical 
infrastructure against criminal cyber intrusions? 
Through a review of DHS budgetary documents, evidence suggests that DHS has 
consistently chosen to devote disproportionate budgetary resources to develop defensive 
technologies of questionable effectiveness, initiate redundant information-sharing 
programs, and to develop cyber incidence response teams, while not considering the 
utilization of component agency’s legal authorities and capabilities, namely the U.S. 
Secret Service. The underutilization of the department’s own cyber law enforcement 
component’s capabilities has arguably affected the overall effectiveness and efficiency of 
the department’s efforts. The analysis indicates that the USSS has the expertise and legal 
mandate to integrate the traditional model of criminal investigation and deterrence to the 
realm of cyber security and better support the DHS mission. 
Cyber-law enforcement effectiveness was also contrasted against the suitability 
and effectiveness of utilizing intelligence or military agencies to fulfill the nation’s 
domestic cyber-security mission. As Steven Tomisek described in his 2002 report 
Homeland Security: The New Role for Defense, since 9/11, government agencies, 
predominantly represented by the National Security Agency (NSA) and Department of 
Defense (DOD), have aggressively promoted the premise that any cyber threat targeting 
our nation’s critical infrastructure, including the financial infrastructure, should be 
designated as a “national security” threat, regardless of the motivations or identity of the 
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attacker.5 The NSA and DOD have argued that they alone possess the requisite 
capabilities to successfully counter this critical threat to our national security through 
domestic and international cyber operations. Evidence presented in this thesis indicates 
that DHS’s apparent acceptance of the premise that NSA/DOD should provide domestic 
technical assistance, cyber security support, and mitigation may be in violation of 
existing laws prohibiting domestic operations by the intelligence community and 
military. 
Additionally, as argued by Tyler Moore, Allan Friedman and Ariel D. Procaccia 
in “Would a ‘Cyber Warrior’ Protect Us?: Exploring Trade-offs between Attack and 
Defense of Information Systems,” relying on the intelligence community (IC) and 
military cyber attack units to provide effective defensive information and technology may 
be a faulty assumption because providing that information would be counter to the IC and 
military’s primary missions and negatively affect their overall effectiveness.6 The 
analysis indicated that the government’s proposed designation of all cyber attacks 
targeting the nation’s critical infrastructure as a “national security” event was initiated 
and fully supported by the IC and military. This designation, regardless of the identity or 
motivations of the perpetrator, was described within this thesis as a thinly veiled attempt 
to provide justification for the NSA/DOD to operate domestically despite the fact that the 
FBI is the only agency legally authorized to conduct domestic intelligence operations to 
counter national security threats. Finally, this proposal by the IC was presented as an 
effort that could threaten our citizens’ privacy due to the lack of intelligence community 
operational oversight and the borderless nature of the cyber world.  
This thesis, and supporting research, offers comparative information to support 
the formulation of government cyber-security policy that develops the most effective, 
integrated cyber-security methods while protecting civil liberties and our citizens’ 
5 Steven J. Tomisek, Homeland Security: The New Role for Defense (Washington, DC: Institute for 
National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2002). 
6 Tyler Moore, Allan Friedman, and Ariel D. Procaccia, “Would a ‘Cyber Warrior’ Protect Us?: 
Exploring Trade-Offs between Attack and Defense of Information Systems,” in Proceedings of the 2010 
Workshop on New Security Paradigms (New York: 2010 ACM, 2010), 85–94, doi:978-1-4503-0415-3. 
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privacy. This thesis then offers policy recommendations to assist in this whole of 
government cyber security effort. These recommendations include: 
• DOD/NSA must remain focused on nation-state cyber threats and 
foreign activities. To ensure that the NSA, the nation’s premier SIGINT 
collection agency, remains focused on the exploitation of foreign SIGINT 
and foreign espionage activities in support of our national security 
interests, as well as to protect our citizens’ civil liberties, the agency must 
not be permitted to utilize its capabilities on domestic targets or systems. 
Additionally, the DOD cyber attack forces must not operate on or within 
domestic cyber systems, unless owned by the DOD, and must concentrate 
their activities to exploiting foreign vulnerabilities.  
• FBI must remain the only IC agency permitted to operate 
domestically with proper judicial oversight. The bureau’s domestic 
cyber intelligence activity must be limited to the investigation of 
espionage threats which are committed by nation-state supported actors 
that 1.) Seek to gain knowledge from information systems which contain 
information of national security value or; 2.) Attack critical infrastructure 
systems to degrade or disrupt such systems to cause a national crisis. The 
FBI Cyber Criminal Division should continue to investigate cyber 
intrusions within their criminal jurisdictions.  
• DHS should continue to enhance its network defense capabilities and 
information sharing initiatives but must increase its utilization and 
reliance on the deterrent effect of USSS cyber criminal investigations 
as an integral part of the department’s cyber security efforts. 
Although, as indicated within this thesis, defensive technology can never 
be expected to thwart the most determined or advanced attackers, 
defensive technology does provide a high level of protection. As presented 
within the thesis, in recognition of the inherent vulnerabilities in cyber 
systems, deterrent law enforcement operations are necessary to ensure 
attackers are identified and apprehended. 
In closing, the thesis identifies additional areas of research that are required to 
support the development of adaptable policies scalable to the rapidly changing cyber 
threat environment. As demonstrated through the literature review, the existing research 
into the threats against U.S. critical cyber infrastructure has generally focused on the two 
key methods of attaining cyber security: 1) utilizing defensive technology as described in 
John McHugh, Alan Christie, and Julia Allen’s article “Defending Yourself: The Role of 
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Intrusion Detection Systems,” regarding intrusion detection systems,7 for example, and 2) 
offensive operations that identify and eliminate the actors who seek to target our cyber 
systems8 as discussed in Susan Brenner’s article in the Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology titled “At Light Speed.”  
Areas for future research include a review of emerging technologies that provide 
more adaptable defensive precautions through leveraging artificial intelligence. At some 
point, it is possible that the technology will supplant the need for human decisions and 
intervention that is often identified as the point of failure during a post-intrusion review. 
Another area of valuable research is a review of successful cyber security efforts initiated 
by the private sector, how the need for those efforts was advertised within the corporate 
structure to gather support, and the way that those successes could be imitated or initiated 
throughout the government enterprise. Related to this topic, a comprehensive study of the 
cyber security efforts of other nations and whether those efforts could be employed 
within the U.S. could prove beneficial to policy makers. Finally, additional research 
regarding deterrence or game theory as it applies to low-level attackers, 
advanced/organized criminal actors, and nation-state supported cyber threats should be 
conducted to more thoroughly evaluate the effectiveness of offensive operations against 
attackers of different skill levels and motivations.  
  
7 John McHugh, Alan Christie, and Julia Allen, “Defending Yourself: The Role of Intrusion Detection 
Systems,” IEEE Software, September 2000, 42. 
8 Susan W. Brenner, “ ‘At Light Speed’: Attribution and Response to Cybercrime/Terrorism/Warfare,” 
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (1973-) 97, no. 2 (January 1, 2007): 379–475, doi:10.2307/
40042831. 
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I. FRAMING THE SCOPE 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. government 
worked to reassure the American public and provide for their safety from terrorist attack. 
During this turbulent time, sweeping organizational changes were made to the 
government’s structure to facilitate increased security and operational efficiency. Among 
the most significant was the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
with the passage of Public Law 107–296 (Homeland Security Act of 2002) on November 
25, 2002.1 
In 2001, the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) was operationally aligned within the U.S. 
Treasury Department where, since its formation in 1865 to suppress the counterfeiting of 
U.S. currency, it had continued to develop its expertise and experience consistent success 
in financial crimes investigations.2 Over the course of its history, the Secret Service’s 
investigative authorities had evolved, and the agency had adapted its capabilities to 
account for changing technologies that threatened the nation’s critical financial 
infrastructure. As the financial sector became increasingly reliant on cyber technologies, 
and the threat emanating from cyberspace became more pervasive, the USSS consistently 
increased its investment in cyber-investigative capabilities. The USA Patriot Act, passed 
on October 26, 2001, called for an expansion of the USSS Electronic Crime Task Force 
(ECTF) model, which had been proven to be a successful method of investigating the 
terrorist use of cyber technologies and the prevention of attacks against the nation’s 
financial infrastructure through aggressive enforcement and information sharing.3  
In 2003, the USSS, although mandated to remain a distinct agency operating 
within its own authorities, was transferred to the Department of Homeland Security 
1 An Act to Establish the Department of Homeland Security and for Other Purposes (Homeland 
Security Act) Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296 Stat. 2135 (2002).  
2 Richard Harlow, “Two Missions, One Secret Service: The Value of the Investigative Mission” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011).  
3 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
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(DHS), whose mission was to ensure the security of the nation from terrorist attack.4 
Since that time, DHS’s mission has expanded to include the security and resilience of the 
nation’s 16 Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR), which includes the 
financial infrastructure and cyberspace.5 The National Protection and Programs 
Directorate (NPPD) was formed to coordinate the department’s cyber-security mission 
but, as reflected in governmental reports, the directorate has underutilized DHS 
component cyber-investigative capabilities, namely the USSS cyber investigation 
expertise, to further the department’s cyber-security mission.6 This underutilization 
arguably affects the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the department. 
Since 9/11, government agencies, predominantly representing the intelligence 
community (IC) and military cyber-attack units, have aggressively promoted the belief 
that any cyber threat targeting our nation’s critical infrastructure should be designated as 
a “national security” threat, regardless of the motivations or identity of the attacker.7 Not 
surprisingly, those proponents have also argued that they alone possess the requisite 
capabilities to successfully counter this existential threat to our national security through 
domestic and international cyber operations. Detractors have argued that domestic IC and 
military operations violate prohibitions that are in place to protect our citizens’ privacy 
and civil liberties.  
It is important to examine and better understand the cyber threats targeting our 
nation’s critical infrastructure, as well as the motivations of the actual attackers, to 
facilitate the development and implementation of a comprehensive cyber security strategy 
for the government and private sector infrastructure owners. Once the threat has been 
accurately defined, agencies involved in cyber defense, cyber attack, intelligence or cyber 
law enforcement operations can be provided clear operational parameters and missions. A 
4 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). 
5 U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 
(Washington, DC: DHS, 2009) https://www.dhs.gov/national-infrastructure-protection-plan. 
6 Frank Deffer, Planning, Management, and Systems Issues Hinder DHS’ Efforts to Protect 
Cyberspace and the Nation’s Cyber Infrastructure, Office of the Inspector General (DHS-OIG, June 2011), 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=683172.  
7 Thomas Rid, “The Great Cyberscare: Why the Pentagon Is Razzmatazzing You about Those Big Bad 
Chinese Hackers,” Foreign Policy, March 13, 2013.  
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government-wide strategy, which leverages agency specific capabilities, can then be 
developed to ensure our cyber-security enterprise is optimally utilized. This strategy must 
include detailed policy guidelines for the government agencies involved in the effort as 
well as clear responsibilities for both the private and public sector in this collaborative 
effort. This research offers comparative information to support the formulation of 
government cyber-security policy that develops the most effective, integrated cyber-
security methods while protecting our citizens’ civil liberties and privacy. 
B. BACKGROUND 
1. Post-9/11 U.S. Government Terrorism Focus 
With his 2002 State of the Union Address following shortly after the worst 
terrorist attack in our nation’s history, President Bush began what is often described as 
one of the greatest transformations of American government policy and focus in our 
history.   
Our first priority must always be the security of our Nation, and that will 
be reflected in the budget I send to Congress. My budget supports three 
great goals for America:  We will win this war; we’ll protect our 
homeland and we will revive our economy….Time and distance from the 
events of September the 11th will not make us safer unless we act on its 
lessons. America is no longer protected by vast oceans. We are protected 
from attack only by vigorous action abroad, and increased vigilance at 
home.8  
For many Americans, our recollection of personal and historical events are 
separated into “pre” and “post” September 11th time references. Enders and Sandler, in 
their study titled “After 9/11; Is it all Different Now?” state that President Bush’s 2002 
State of the Union Address strongly suggested that everything about American life 
changed on 9/11 and that the nation had to concentrate all its resources to fight a network 
of terrorists bent on committing violent acts against the homeland.9 A historical review of 
the changes this country has undergone since 9/11 seem to bear out President Bush’s 
8 George W. Bush, “2002 State of the Union Address,” Business Source Complete, Vital Speeches of 
the Day, 68, no. 9 (February 15, 2002): 5. 
9 Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, “After 9/11: Is It All Different Now?” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 49, no. 2 (April 1, 2005): 259, doi:10.1177/0022002704272864. 
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prediction. The nation’s focus on defeating the terrorist threat and ensuring the greatest 
level of homeland security caused massive increases in expenditures to defeat the “new” 
threat.10  
In the days immediately following the attacks of 9/11, the Bush administration 
sought to establish a framework to guide and codify the changes that he had indicated 
were neccesary in his address. These early decisions and efforts ushered in an era of 
sweeping organizational change to the government, including a reorganization of the U.S. 
intelligence program and the formation of a massive new cabinet level department. As 
these changes were initiated, the American public,which was struggling to regain its 
equilibrium from the attacks, was becoming much more accepting of  increased 
government impact on citizens’ privacy to defeat the perceived threat specifically focused 
on terrorism.   
To quickly facilitate the steps the administration desired, on October 8, 2001, 
President Bush issued Executive Order (EO) 13228. This established an Office of 
Homeland Security within the Executive Office of the President (EOP) to be managed by 
an Assistant to the President for Homeland Security.11 The primary mission of the new 
position was to develop and coordinate a comprehensive national strategy to secure the 
nation from terrorist threat or attack.12 In developing the national strategy, the new 
position required the authority to coordinate with many entities from both inside and 
outside the government. The responsibilities and duties of this office also included 
managing the collection and analysis of information regarding terrorist groups within the 
United States, coordination and information sharing with the intelligence community, 
preparedness and mitigation of terrorist attacks within the homeland, prevention of future 
terrorist attacks through information sharing, response and recovery to terrorist attacks, 
10 Ibid. 
11 George W. Bush, “Executive Order Establishing Office of Homeland Security,” in Proceedings of 
the 12th Annual Conference on Computers, Freedom and Privacy (New York: ACM, 2002), 
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=543487. 
12 Ibid., 1. 
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incidence management, and to ensure continuity of government in the face of terrorist 
attacks.13 
In what is commonly accepted as the most impactful and debated legislative 
action of the post-9/11 era, on October 26, 2001, the 107th Congress passed Public Law 
107–56 titled “The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001.14 
(hereinafter “the Patriot Act”). This legislation was specifically directed at providing 
increased authorities and capabilities to government agencies to more effectively 
investigate, identify and interupt the terrorist threat to the homeland. To support the 
counter-terrorism focus of the government in the post-9/11 era, new techniques included  
“enhanced” surveillance procedures which involved sweeping changes to many 
provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, strengthened 
laws regarding terrorist financing, border security, intelligence sharing amongst law 
enforcement and the intelligence community; and changes to the bank secrecy laws.,1516 
Consistent with the effort to identify and interupt terrorist activities, the Patriot Act also 
commanded the U.S. Secret Service to expand its network of ECTFs with investigative 
emphasis being placed on electronically enabled crimes which were supporting terrorism 
funding or operations.17 
Shortly therafter, on October 29, 2001, President Bush issued Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive-1 (HSPD-1), which formed the Homeland Security Council (HSC) 
to assist the new Assistant to the President in securing the homeland from the threat of 
future terrorist attacks.18 The HSC was directed to be composed of senior executives 
13 Ibid., 2. 
14 USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
15 Ibid. 
16 Paul T. Jaeger, John Carlo Bertot, and Charles R. McClure, “The Impact of the USA Patriot Act on 
Collection and Analysis of Personal Information under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,” 
Government Information Quarterly 20, no. 3 (July 2003): 295, doi:10.1016/S0740-624X(03)00057-1. 
17 USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
18 George Bush, “Homeland Security Presidential Directive 1: Organization and Operation of the 
Homeland Security Council” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, November 5, 2001, 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=1132. 
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from select Cabinet-level government agencies who could provide guidance to the 
administration on protecting the homeland and responding to the terrorist threat.   
A review of the government response to the 9/11 attacks and the intiatives that 
were undertaken underscores that the government was wholly focused on the terrorist 
threat to the homeland from foreign actors with little initial focus on catalogueing 
potential terrorist targets within the homeland or any real understanding of the threat to 
the safety and security of the homeland and American population. The next section 
identifies and documents the government’s increasing realization that terrorism was only 
one of many threats facing the homeland, and that a much larger organization which 
could prepare and plan for a wider range of the threats, was required.  
2. Department of Homeland Security and the Government’s Changing 
Focus 
On November 25, 2002, the 107th Congress passed Public Law 107–296, 
commonly identified by the short title “The Homeland Security Act of 2002” (HSA).19  
The HSA formed the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), with the authority to 
operate as an executive department of the United States.20 The primary mission of the 
department was to prevent terrorist attacks, lessen the nation’s vulnerability to terrorist 
attack, minimize damage from attacks, and increase the national resiliency.21 
Recognizing that many existing government agencies possessed homeland security 
related capabilities and authorities, the Act also identified agencies that were eventually 
organizationally re-aligned under the new department, while also forming new 
component agencies through the combination of multiple agencies or missions under one 
component agency.   
Although the impetus for the formation of DHS was specifically in response to 
the perceived terrorist threat, the inclusion of the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA), which was the recognized authority in responding to mass casualty or 




                                                 
resiliency events, unwittingly provided a wider prism through which to view the 
homeland security mission.22 This wider mission space offered the new department 
opportunities that would enable it to quickly grow its influence beyond terrorist attack 
prevention, response, and mitigation, and move aggressively into an “all hazards” 
approach to homeland security.23 According to some researchers, this “all hazards” 
approach has resulted in some DHS agencies being forced to de-emphasize their legacy 
missions to fulfill the new requirements of the department.24 
Among the 22 agencies re-aligned under the newly formed department were the 
U.S. Secret Service and the U.S. Coast Guard, two agencies that struggled to retain their 
identities and unique history while still adding value to the new department. For the U.S. 
Secret Service, which had been a valued agency of the U.S. Treasury Department since 
its formation in 1865, re-alignment to a department that had limited interest in financial 
crime investigations and dignitary protection was tumultuous. Unrecognized by many 
within the Secret Service during those early years in DHS, portions of the department’s 
changing focus could allow the Secret Service to position itself and its cyber capabilities 
and authorities at the forefront of the growing departmental mission of cyber crimes and 
cyber security operations.   
Although, as discussed above, the DHS’s initial focus on terrorism-related matters 
and its increasing gravitation toward an “all hazards” approach to homeland security is 
often identified as “mission creep,” the research supporting this thesis identified that the 
U.S. government had been steadily moving toward an “all hazards” approach since the 
1990s. Increasingly, the government had been gaining better understanding of the 
interconnectivity and vulnerability of the nation’s identified critical infrastructures to 
terrorist attack or other disruption.  
22 Dara Kay Cohen, Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, and Barry R. Weingast, “Crisis Bureaucracy: 
Homeland Security and the Political Design of Legal Mandates,” Stanford Law Review 59, no. 3 
(December 1, 2006): 26, doi:10.2307/40040307. 
23 Ibid., 26. 
24 Ibid., 27. 
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In 1996, President Clinton established the President’s Commission of Critical 
Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) with the mission of providing guidance regarding the 
scope and nature of the threat and vulnerabilities of the nation’s critical infrastructure 
with a specific focus on threats emanating from cyber space.25 The commission identified 
critical infrastructures, grouped in “sectors,” the loss or disruption of which could 
debilitate or destroy the nation’s defense, stability or economic well-being.26 It also 
identified infrastructure that included power, communications, emergency services, 
water, transportation, and banking/financial systems among others.27 Although the 
commission found that there were no imminent human-caused threats that could result in 
a national crisis, it did identify that the threat from terrorism or attack, specifically 
through cyber attack was a growing threat that required attention from the government.28 
In response to the commission’s findings, in May 1998, President Clinton issued 
classified Presidential Decision Directive-63 (PDD-63) that called for “reliable, 
interconnected, and secure information system infrastructure by the year 2003; and 
significantly increased security to government systems by the year 2000.”29 PDD-63 also 
called for an immediate establishment of a national center to warn of and respond to 
attacks, and to ensure the capability to protect critical infrastructures from intentional acts 
by 2003.30 Finally, the document directed the administration to addresses the cyber and 
physical infrastructure vulnerabilities of the federal government by requiring each 
department and agency to work to reduce its exposure to new threats.31  
25 John Moteff, Critical Infrastructures: Background, Policy, and Implementation (CRS Report 
RL30153) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 21, 2014), 6. 
26    President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, Critical Foundations: Protecting 
America’s Infrastructures (Washington, DC: President’s Commission on Infrastructure Protection, October 
1997), 19. 
27 Ibid., 20. 
28 Ibid.,14. 
29 William Clinton Administration, Presidential Decision Directive-63 (Washington, DC: The White 




                                                 
DHS is uniquely suited to this mission when one considers the pre-existing 
government concentration on critical infrastructures and the varied expertise represented 
within DHS component agencies. Component agencies, including the Secret Service, 
FEMA, and others already possessed comprehensive legal authorities and capabilities 
that provided DHS with the immediate authority and expertise to secure the homeland 
and our cyber supported Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources from attack. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The frequency, severity, and effects of attacks emanating from cyberspace that 
target U.S. critical infrastructure and interests continue to increase. As the lead U.S. 
government agency mandated to coordinate the security of the nation’s cyber-supported 
critical infrastructure, DHS seeks to identify and implement the most effective methods 
to enhance American cyber security. To achieve success in this developing homeland 
security mission, DHS’s coordination efforts must leverage defensive technology, the 
offensive and cyber-intelligence collection capabilities of the NSA/DOD and FBI, and 
the deterrent effect offered by cyber law enforcement activities.  
• Primary research question:  What strategies can the U.S. government 
develop that support the efforts of DHS, in concert with other 
governmental cyber security entities, to ensure the nation’s cyber-
supported critical infrastructure is provided with the most comprehensive 
security, while ensuring our citizens’ privacy and security are preserved? 
• Secondary research question: How could the application of established 
law enforcement investigative authorities and capabilities augment the 
technology-centric, defensive cyber methods currently utilized by the 
Department of Homeland Security to secure the nation’s critical 
infrastructure against criminal cyber intrusions? 
D. RESEARCH METHOD 
Through the application of policy analysis, this thesis examines the cyber-security 
mission, authorities and capabilities of four components: the Department of Homeland 
Security, the National Security Agency (NSA) (inclusive of the Department of Defense’s 
Cyber Command), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the U.S. Secret Service. 
The thesis features a comparison of the applicability and effectiveness of those agency’s 
specific cyber authorities and capabilities. These agencies were chosen for this thesis 
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because DHS was mandated to coordinate the homeland security effort, the NSA is the 
leading IC cyber security and attack agency and the FBI and USSS share concurrent 
jurisdiction regarding the investigation of cyber intrusions against any protected 
computer system.  
The inquiry reviews departmental cyber-security policies and compares the 
effectiveness of the department’s technology-centric cyber security approach against the 
deterrent effect realized through offensive, specifically law enforcement, cyber 
operations. Cyber-law enforcement effectiveness is also contrasted against the suitability 
and effectiveness of the militarization of cyberspace and the cyber-security mission.    
The thesis is limited to a review of DHS’s efficiency and success in the cyber-
security mission, the statutory cyber-investigative authorities and capabilities of the 
USSS and the FBI, and the suitability of the current cyber-security methods that 
predominantly feature defensive technology. In line with this avenue of analysis, the 
review examines the suitability and effectiveness of the DOD/NSA’s position as the 
primary security apparatus defending the nation’s cyber-supported critical infrastructure. 
Because scientifically quantifying the deterrent effect of offensive cyber operations 
requires the accurate measurement of its effect on the personal beliefs and activities of a 
prospective attacker, this product does not attempt to capture the numbers. Instead, the 
research analyzes the available literature on deterrence to a prospective cyber intruder 
that results from offensive cyber-security effort. Given the numerous drivers that cause a 
malicious cyber actor to intrude into a protected cyber system, accurately accounting for 
a comprehensive deterrent effect may be impossible or lead to offering inaccurate 
observations.  
The source data includes academic and governmental sources. These sources 
include governmental regulatory publications, existing statuary regulation and laws, 
scholarly products that directly relate to thesis topics, and program reviews of various 
cyber-security missions and capabilities. To control bias in the supporting research, the 
collection of information included a diverse cross section of practitioners; the research 
does not include interviews or surveys.   
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At the conclusion of this thesis, a more comprehensive understanding of the U.S. 
government’s cyber-security policies and the successes or limitations of those policies is 
made clear. Additionally, a greater understanding of the efficiency and effectiveness of 
cyber-security practices, the legal implications and privacy concerns inherent in the 
current militarization of cyberspace and the effectiveness of cyber-law enforcement 
activities is gained. This thesis allows the reader to apply the knowledge to propose 
policies to support a future, comprehensive cyber-security effort while still protecting the 
Internet’s openness and functionality.  
E. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Chapter II documents and discusses the executive orders, presidential directives, 
and legislation that propelled the changing cyber security mission of the government, 
specifically through the Department of Homeland Security, in its mission of safeguarding 
the critical infrastructure from attack and exploitation. Chapter II provides the reader with 
the current government cyber security policy and provides a basis to understand how the 
development of cyber security policies evolved to its current state. 
Chapter III provides the literature review that summarizes the existing knowledge 
and identifies opportunities for further research within the subject area. The review 
includes sources representing government, academia, and the private sector. Additionally, 
applicable government laws and policies, as well as agencies responsible for the cyber 
security of the nation’s critical infrastructure are reviewed and analyzed to capture the 
opinions of the leading experts regarding the effectiveness and complimentary utilization 
of the two principal approaches to cyber security. These approaches are 1) the defensive 
use of technology and 2) offensive operations, which provide a deterrent effect. 
Chapter IV provides a description of the evolving cyber security missions of 
DHS, the National Security Agency (NSA) inclusive of the Department of Defense 
(DOD)/Cyber Command, The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the U.S. Secret 
Service. 
Chapter V applies the evidence from the literature review to analyze the 
implications of the current cyber-security strategies including: defensive techniques, the 
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application of military offensive cyber attack and exploitation techniques, national 
security centric investigations, and the application of criminal investigations and 
prosecution to deter cyber attacks against the nation’s critical infrastructure.   
Finally, Chapter VI offers conclusions, policy recommendations, and areas of 
future research to support development of a comprehensive cyber security strategy for 
this nation.   
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II. POST-9/11 U.S. GOVERNMENT CIKR CYBER FOCUS 
The preceding chapter chronicled the sweeping changes that the terror attacks of 
September 11, 2001, brought to America and its people. In the years immediately 
following the attacks, the government worked to develop a framework of governance and 
organization to support a comprehensive homeland security enterprise in an effort to 
secure the nation from the threat of terrorism. The formation of the Department of 
Homeland Security, in combination with sweeping new legislation, helped identify, 
disrupt, and in some cases, prosecute, terrorist plots against the homeland. But, as DHS 
developed its methods on securing the nation’s CIKR from terrorist attack, the U.S. 
government was moving toward a greater understanding of the threats emanating from 
cyberspace and issuing guidance and legislation to secure this new area from cyber 
attacks.  
A. PRESIDENTIAL CYBER POLICY DIRECTIVES AND CYBER 
EXECUTIVE ORDERS 
Although the post-September 11 government focus was predominately on 
preventing another act of terrorism, in February 2003, President George Bush issued the 
“National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace” in recognition of the increasing importance 
that cyber supported critical infrastructures played in our nation’s security.32 This 
strategy called for a national effort to prevent future cyber attacks, reduce vulnerabilities 
and increase the resilience of our nation’s critical systems.33 Additionally, the strategy 
initiated the often-repeated statement that the majority of the nation’s critical 
infrastructure is owned by the private sector, and that private organizations naturally 
possess a much greater capacity for enhancing our cyber security.34 This early strategy 
also identified that attributing a cyber attack to a particular threat actor is the most 
difficult, but most important, aspect of responding to cyber attacks. In recognition of this, 
32 The White House, National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (Washington, DC: White House Office, 
February 2003), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=1040. 
33 Ibid., 9. 
34 Ibid., 10. 
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the president called for increased information sharing with the private sector, additional 
support for law enforcement operations in responding to attacks against the private 
sector, and more advanced responses from the intelligence community in responding to 
national security events targeting secure government systems.,3536  
Shortly after issuing the above strategy, on December 17, 2003, President Bush 
announced the release of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7: Critical 
Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization and Protection (HSPD-7).37 HSPD-7 
formalized the national policy regarding securing the nation’s critical infrastructure and 
cyber systems from terrorist attack or exploitation.38 With this directive, DHS, which had 
been formed to secure the homeland from terrorist attacks, saw its mission officially 
expanded to include “all hazards” critical infrastructure protection with an emphasis on 
securing our nation’s cyber supported critical infrastructure. Finally, this directive 
continued with the warning that DHS must ensure the privacy of American citizens’ 
information and communications while enhancing cyber security.39  
In January 2008, President Bush launched the Comprehensive National Cyber 
Security Initiative (CNCI), which supported mandates reportedly issued in the classified 
National Security Presidential Directive 54/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23 
(NSPD54/HSPD23).40 In an effort to increase the government’s cyber security 
effectiveness and operations, the CNCI mandated increased government investment in 
cyber security monitoring tools, training, and increased information-sharing operations 
with the private sector but provided little funding or support for cyber investigative 
35 Ibid., 12. 
36 Ibid., 13. 
37 George W. Bush Administration, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7: Critical 
Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization and Protection (Washington, DC: White House Office, 
December 17, 2003). 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 John Rollins and Anna Henning, Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative: Legal 
Authorities and Policy Considerations (CRS Report No. R40427) (Washington DC: Congressional 
Research Service, March 10, 2009), 2. 
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operations.41 Of note, the CNCI specifically designated DHS as the lead for coordinating 
with the private sector to secure the nation’s CIKR from cyber attack.42  
In an effort to keep the government focused on the threat emanating from 
cyberspace during the election cycle, in December 2008, the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies released their report titled “Securing CyberSpace for the 44th 
Presidency.”43 This report called on the president to designate cyberspace as a vital asset 
of the nation and to use all assets at his disposal, including diplomacy, the military, 
economic prosperity, and law enforcement to ensure that cyberspace remains available to 
all citizens and businesses while ensuring their privacy.44 Although this report identified 
nation state actors as the most damaging of the threats the nation faced, the report spent 
considerable time enumerating the threat posed by cybercrime and the need to develop 
cooperative international standards to quickly and effectively respond to criminal cyber 
attacks.45 In fact, the report noted that successful law enforcement actions result in 
attacker attribution, more comprehensive repair, and the most effective level of 
deterrence because “the criminal hacker community pays attention when other criminal 
computer criminals are caught and punished.”46 In effect, a successful cyber intrusion 
investigation and apprehension of those responsible results in a deterrent effect beyond 
the attackers who are brought to justice, the deterrence of attacks by prospective intruders 
may also be realized. 
Indicative of the government’s focus on cyber security and the threats to the 
nation’s critical infrastructure, shortly after taking office, President Barack Obama’s 
National Security Council (NSC) release the Cyberspace Policy Review.47 In a first-of-
41 National Security Council (NSC), Cyberspace Policy Review: Securing America’s Digital Future 
(New York: Cosmo Reports., May 2009). 
42 “The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative,” The White House, accessed September 26, 
2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy/cybersecurity/national-initiative. 
43 James A. Lewis, Securing Cyberspace for the 44th Presidency (Washington, DC: Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, December 2008). 
44 Ibid., 13. 
45 Ibid., 28. 
46 Ibid., 37. 
47 NSC, Cyberspace Policy Review. 
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its-kind declaration, the review identified cybercrime committed by both state and non-
state actors as a growing threat that need to be accounted for in any cyber security 
program.,4849 Additionally, the review highlighted the financial loss being experienced 
by our nation’s financial institutions from cybercrime as a national priority, called for the 
establishment of a “cyber czar” to coordinate the national effort, and designated cyber as 
one of the administration’s key priorities.50  
In March 2011, the administration followed those directives with Presidential 
Policy Directive-8 (PPD-8), which established a mandate to develop a process to 
systematically secure the nation’s cyber supported critical infrastructure and to ensure an 
effective response and recovery plan from all hazards.51 Once again, the administration 
identified the Secretary of DHS as the coordinator for this effort.52 
Of particular importance, in October 2012, President Obama issued PPD-20 
(classified) which was discussed in a Washington Post article on November 12, 2012.53 
According to media reports, PPD-20 provided strict but broad guidance for federal 
agencies and the military to operate both offensively and defensively in cyberspace or in 
furtherance of the prosecution of the, as yet undefined, cyberwar or cyber terrorism.54 
Also, as reported by the Washington Post, the directive explicitly delineated between 
cyber defense (operations conducted within one’s own network) and cyber operations 
(actions outside of one’s own network).55 Although the directive specifically highlighted 
48 Ibid., 3. 
49 Ibid., 5. 
50 Ibid., 8. 
51 “Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness,” The White House, March 30, 2011, 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=7423. 
52 Ibid., 4. 
53 Barak Obama Administration, Presidential Policy Directive 20: Cyber Operations of Military and 
Federal Agencies (Classified) (Washington, DC: White House Office, October 2010), 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=725668; Ellen Nakashima, “Obama Signs Secret Directive to Help 
Thwart Cyberattacks,” Washington Post, November 14, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/obama-signs-secret-cybersecurity-directive-allowing-more-aggressive-military-role/2012/
11/14/7bf51512-2cde-11e2-9ac2-1c61452669c3_story.html. 
54 Nakashima, “Obama Signs Secret Directive 
55 Ibid. 
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the requirement that our citizens’ privacy must always be protected in offensive 
operations and that law enforcement action should always be the primary response to 
cyber attack, the Post article indicates that General Keith Alexander of the National 
Security Agency (NSA) argued for less restrictions being placed on his Department of 
Defense (DOD) cyber attack forces.56 
On February 12, 2013, President Obama issued PPD-21, to codify the 
government’s policy on ensuring the security and resilience of the nation’s critical 
infrastructure.57 This policy required the DHS secretary to work with state, local and 
tribal partners to identify the nation’s interconnected critical infrastructures; conduct 
security assessments through the utilization of DHS component agency’s authorities; and 
to work with the Attorney General to investigate and prosecute physical and cyber attacks 
against the infrastructure.58 
Finally, on February 19, 2013, the Obama administration issued Executive Order 
13636 (EO-13636)—Improving Critical Infrastructure Cyber Security. This EO directed 
the DHS secretary to develop a cyber-security framework that provides specific guidance 
to private infrastructure owners in securing their systems while maintaining the privacy 
of system owners and users.59 This EO also directed the secretary to initiate a program to 
provide classified information to system owners in an effort to provide actionable 
information to be utilized in the cyber security effort.60   
B. DHS CYBER POLICIES AND CHANGING MISSION FOCUS 
By 2005, the department’s single issue focus centering on terrorism was being 
replaced by a focus on an “all hazards” approach to safeguarding the identified Critical 
Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR) that form the underpinnings of the nation’s 
56 Ibid. 
57 “Presidential Policy Directive 21: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience,” The White 
House, February 12, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-
directive-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Exec. Order 13636, C.F.R. 11739 (2013). 
60 Ibid. 
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prosperity.61 During his July 13, 2005, speech announcing his “Second Stage Review” of 
the department’s goals and organization, DHS Secretary Chertoff indicated that the 
department was focusing on the nation’s CIKR. Additionally, with his announcement of a 
new Assistant Secretary for Cyber and Telecommunications Security within the 
department, Secretary Chertoff brought cyber security and the cyber systems that support 
the CIKR into the forefront of the DHS mission.62 
In 2008, Secretary Chertoff issued the DHS Strategic Plan for 2008–2013, which 
was envisioned to set the five-year organizational priorities for the department.63 
Although by this time, most administration strategy documents were increasingly focused 
on cyber security and the interconnected critical infrastructures, this publication focused 
on an “all hazards” approach with specific sections on border security, immigration, 
importation of dangerous goods, and critical infrastructure that was vulnerable to cyber 
attack.64  
The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) quickly followed the Strategic 
plan in 2009.65  The NIPP clearly identified that cyber attack had the capability to affect 
all of the nation’s CIKR due to the interconnectivity afforded by the Internet and that the 
threat was an expected to constantly increasing.66 Although the NIPP spent considerable 
time enumerating the authorities of DHS to secure the nation’s infrastructure through 
defensive measures, none of the various component agencies of the department, including 
DHS, law enforcement agencies nor their legal authorities, were referenced in the 
document. In fact, the only law enforcement entity referenced was DHS’ shared 
responsibility with the Department of Justice (DOJ), through the Federal Bureau of 
61 “Secretary Michael Chertoff, U.S. Department of Homeland Security Second Stage Review 
Remarks,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, July 13, 2005, http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/
speech_0255.shtm. 
62 Ibid. 
63 U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), One Team, One Mission, Securing Our Homeland: 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2008–2013 (Washington, DC: DHS, 
2008), http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA487194. 
64 Ibid., 6–15. 
65 DHS, National Infrastructure Protection Plan. 
66 Ibid., 12. 
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Investigation (FBI).67 As will be discussed later in this thesis, DHS’ focus on defensive 
cybersecurity measures, and the almost total dismissal of DHS’ own law enforcement 
agency’s authorities and capabilities, became a common issue in the future operations. 
In February 2010, DHS, now headed by the newly confirmed Secretary Janet 
Napolitano, issued the first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR), which was 
envisioned to outline a framework to guide homeland security participants toward a 
common goal.68 Specifically, the QHSR identified that a safe and secure homeland 
required more than preventing terrorist attacks, it also identified that citizens’ privacy 
must be secured while protecting the nation’s economic security and way of life.69 The 
QHSR continued to stress an “all hazards” approach to homeland security but also 
maintained that the threat from transnational organized crime groups, including cyber 
crime groups, posed to the homeland was a growing issue requiring the nation’s 
attention.70 For the first time, cyber crime and attack was listed as the third gravest threat 
to our nation’s prosperity, behind only weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and global 
violent extremism, although, once again, DHS chose to concentrate on defensive 
technology.71  
Five months later, in July 2010, DHS released the Bottom-Up Review (BUR), 
which sought to examine the programs, plans, and structures of the department and to 
align the organizational structure and programmatic activities with the QHSR.72 The BUR 
was the first departmental policy document to specifically highlight the U.S. Secret 
Service (USSS) and Immigrations and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) criminal cyber 
investigative capabilities although the document also identified the department’s National 
Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) as coordinating the department’s cyber 
67 Ibid., 20. 
68 U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Quadrennial Homeland Security Review 
(Washington, DC: DHS, February 2010, http://www.dhs.gov/quadrennial-homeland-security-review-qhsr. 
69 Ibid., 9. 
70 Ibid., 14. 
71 Ibid., 19. 
72 U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Bottom-Up Review (Washington, DC: DHS, July 
2010), http://www.dhs.gov/bottom-review. 
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security activities.73 Later, in a section specifically outlining the department’s cyber 
security mission and capabilities, the review recognized that the USSS possessed the 
legal authorities to prevent, detect, and investigate cyber financial crimes while working 
closely with state and local law enforcement to secure our nation’s cyber supported 
critical infrastructure.74  
In contrast to the BUR, in September 2010, a DHS cyber security information 
webpage, titled “Preventing and Defending against Cyber Attacks,” listed the 
department’s cyber security mission areas. The operations promoted in this document 
included automated intrusion detection systems (IDS), secure identity management tools, 
information sharing programs, privacy protection tools, and workforce development 
initiatives with no mention of the department’s own cyber law enforcement agencies.75 
The department’s shifting focus towards the importance of cyberspace was 
complete when, in November 2011, DHS released its Blueprint for a Secure Cyber 
Future, which specifically outlined the cyber security strategy for the homeland security 
enterprise.76 The blueprint’s four goals for protecting cyber-supported critical 
infrastructure included; reduce exposure to cyber risk, ensure priority response and 
recovery, increased resilience and the ability to maintain situational awareness.77 
Although this document was also indicative of the department’s focus on intrusion 
detection tools and technology, when law enforcement activities were described, the 
department chose to highlight the investigative activities of the FBI led National Cyber 
Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF).78  
The documents highlighted in this chapter identified the post-September 11 
U.S. government’s shifting terrorism-centric focus towards a focus on enhancing security 
73 Ibid., 21. 
74 Ibid., 37. 
75 “Preventing and Defending against Cyber Attacks,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
September 2010, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/preventing-and-defending-against-cyber-attacks.pdf. 
76 U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Blueprint for a Secure Cyber Future (Washington, 
DC: DHS, November 2011),  http://www.dhs.gov/blueprint-secure-cyber-future. 
77 Ibid., 4. 
78 Ibid., 21. 
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and resilience to “all hazards” with special emphasis on the threat emanating from cyber 
space. Although DHS was formed to safeguard the nation from future terrorist attacks, 
the department was also slowly shifting to a cyber security and “all hazards” focus. As 
described in the PPDs, EOs and policy/strategy documents, and as will be discussed 
during later chapters regarding policy analysis, to some DHS component agencies, in 
spite of this shift, the department continued to emphasize building internal DHS 
capabilities, technology, and information sharing, and less willing to leverage DHS 
legacy agencies and their authorities. Chapter III reviews available literature pertaining to 
cyber-security tools, techniques and procedures and compares the effectiveness and 
applicability of defensive cyber-security tools against offensive activities. The offensive 
activities, and the deterrence that results from the application of these methods, will 
include cyber law enforcement activities and the use of the military, aka cyber attack, 
forces in cyberspace. 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of the literature review is to summarize the existing knowledge and 
identify opportunities for further research within the subject area. The review includes 
sources representing government, academia, and the private sector. Additionally, 
applicable government laws and policies, as well as the specific agencies responsible for 
the cyber security of the nation’s critical infrastructure were reviewed and analyzed to 
capture the opinions of the leading experts regarding the two principal approaches to 
cyber security:  1) the defensive use of technology and 2) offensive operations, which 
provide a deterrent effect.  
1. Defining the Mission 
As was documented throughout the previous chapters, the government’s mandate 
to DHS to secure the 16 identified CIKRs from attack and ensure their resiliency has an 
inherent friction that inhibits success, as most critical infrastructure is privately owned 
and existing government and private entities resist DHS’ leadership and mandates.79 In 
addition, all CIKRs are supported by, or dependent on, the nation’s cyber infrastructure 
and technology and are vulnerable to threats emanating from cyberspace.80 Throughout 
the department’s attempts to secure cyberspace and the related infrastructures, private 
infrastructure owners and other government agencies have resisted the department’s 
mandates and guidance as unlawful, ineffective, or a violation of privacy.81 In a 
continuing effort to help DHS fulfill its mission, both the Bush and Obama 
administrations issued directives relating to cyber and critical infrastructure security. 
79 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), DHS Needs to Fully Address Lessons Learned 
from Its First Cyber Storm Exercise (GAO-08-825) (Washington, DC: GAO, September 2008), 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=235401. 
80 DHS, Bottom-Up Review. 
81 Matthew Fleming and Eric Goldstein, An Analysis of the Primary Authorities Governing and 
Supporting the Efforts of the Department of Homeland Security to Secure the Cyberspace of the United 
States (Arlington, VA: Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute, May 24, 2011), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2182675. 
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However, there is a lack of existing binding legal authorities to compel the compliance of 
the resistant entities.82  
In 2003, President George W. Bush issued Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive (HSPD)-7, the Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and 
Protection Act.83 This directive assigned DHS the mission of coordinating the defense of 
our nation’s critical infrastructure, mostly through information sharing and guidance to 
private owners. The defensive aspect of this directive may have resulted in DHS’s 
perceived reliance on defensive technologies in fulfilling its cyber-security mission. 
Since that time, both the Bush and Obama Administrations have issued numerous cyber-
security related directives including; the National Strategy to Secure Cyber Space,84 the 
Comprehensive National Cyber Security Initiative,85 the Cyber Space Policy Review,86 
and most recently, Executive Order (EO) 13636- Improving Critical Infrastructure Cyber 
Security,87 and Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 21 - Critical Infrastructure Security 
and Resilience.88  
B. THE DEFENSIVE APPROACH TO CYBERSECURITY 
These PPDs, EOs and federal laws have given DHS the mission of securing the 
nation and the resiliency of its sixteen critical infrastructure and key resources from 
terrorist attack and other disasters. Through a comprehensive review of such 
governmental guiding documents as the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review 
(QHSR),89 the Bottom-Up Review (BUR),90 and the Blueprint for a Secure Cyber 
82 Ibid. 
83 George W. Bush Administration, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7.  
84 White House, National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace. 
85 “The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative.” 
86 NSC, Cyberspace Policy Review. 
87 Exec. Order 13636, C.F.R. 11739 (2013). 
88 “Presidential Policy Directive 21.” 
89 DHS, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review.  
90 DHS, Bottom-Up Review. 
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Future.91 DHS leadership clearly indicated that it believes that comprehensive cyber 
security is achieved through defensive technology.  
Experts in cyber security argue that technology does have specific uses and can be 
an effective tool when utilized as part of a technique known as “defense in depth.”92 This 
technique, which deploys concentric “rings” of security, is actually an adaptation of a 
common technique used in physical security operations; as a potential attacker moves 
further into a protected system the security controls are increasingly stringent and subject 
to greater scrutiny. This technique results in the greatest security measures being applied 
to the most important aspects of a security operation and describes the technique used by 
the U.S. Secret Service in protecting the U.S. president. The technique is also supported 
by other experts in the cyber-security field who agree that a system of active defense is 
much more effective than a static (passive) defense.93  
Other experts argue that the risks to national critical infrastructure far outweigh 
the nation’s abilities to provide security through technological measures.94 John 
McHugh, Alan Christie, and Julia Allen stress that, although the technology is still 
relatively immature and being constantly developed, an intrusion detection system (IDS), 
which is a static system, is effective at notifying system owners of an intrusion attempt on 
a timely basis and are not meant to thwart the attack.95 Additionally, these systems are 
most effective when the IDS is protecting a defined goal—hardly a useful delineation in 
regards to DHS’s mandate to protect all cyber-supported critical infrastructure, which is 
predominantly privately owned. Also, because a defined goal is required for these tools to 
work, Teodor Sommestad, Mathias Ekstedt, and Pontus Johnson stress that this ideal may 
91    DHS, Blueprint for a Secure Cyber Future. 
92 O. Sami Saydjari, “Cyber Defense: Art to Science,” Communications of the ACM 47, no. 3 (March 
2004): 52–57. 
93 Ibid., 54. 
94 Abraham D. Sofaer and Seymour E. Goodman, “Cyber Crime and Security. The Transnational 
Dimension,” in The Transnational Dimension of Cyber Crime and Terrorism, eds. Abraham D. Sofaer and 
Seymour E. Goodman (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2001), http://media.hoover.org/documents/
0817999825_1.pdf. 
95 John McHugh, Alan Christie, and Julia Allen, “Defending Yourself: The Role of Intrusion 
Detection Systems,” IEEE Software, September 2000, 42. 
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be unattainable because defenders can’t be sure what the intruder will actually attack.96 
McHugh et al. have also pointed out that sophisticated attackers may direct their initial 
attack against the IDS to remove the security system, freeing them to move freely 
throughout the target system.97 
To address the concern that the target of an undiscovered attack cannot be 
identified/known, DHS and supporting cyber-security entities have performed variety of 
techniques ranging from tabletop exercises to penetration testing (“pen testing”) of the 
target systems. Although indications are that tabletop exercises can provide valuable 
insight for each of these tools, many examples of failure have resulted.   
Since 2004, DHS has conducted three national level exercises, titled Cyberstorm 
(versions 1, 2 and 3), to test the effectiveness of partner collaboration, information 
sharing, and response to an identified attack.98 Subsequent DHS after-action reports 
indicated that these exercises were very successful and greatly increased the nation’s 
cyber security.99 However, according to Sommestad et al., tabletop testing merely helps 
manage the response to intrusions but, because there is no assurance of the target and 
type of attack an adversary will choose, there is no assurance that the results are 
scientifically valid.100 Additionally, Sommestad et al. indicate that penetration testing of 
targeted systems has been proven to be a valid method of recording when an attack was 
successful in exploiting a known vulnerability but that an unsuccessful pen test, 
conversely, does not indicate that a vulnerability is not present, just that the test did not 
seek to exploit an unidentified vulnerability.101 Ross Anderson, in his “Paddy” scenario, 
adds that a cyber-system defender has to identify all vulnerabilities to achieve success, 
96 Teodor Sommestad, Mathias Ekstedt, and Pontus Johnson, “Cyber Security Risks Assessment with 
Bayesian Defense Graphs and Architectural Models,” in 42nd International Conference on System 
Sciences, 2009, ed. Ralph H. Sprague Jr. (Piscataway, NJ: IEEE, 2009), 2, http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/
abs_all.jsp?arnumber=4755419. 
97 McHugh, Christie, and Allen, “Defending Yourself,” 43. 
98 GAO, DHS Needs to Fully Address Lessons Learned. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Sommestad, Ekstedt, and Johnson, “Cyber Security Risks Assessment,” 9. 
101 Ibid., 7. 
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but an attacker (Paddy) must only identify one vulnerability to achieve success.102 In 
effect, the old adage commonly used in discussions related to sporting events that it is 
easier to attack than defend may prove true in the cyber realm. 
Some experts, who concede that technology may provide added value as a 
defensive component to the nation’s cyber-security precautions, argue that the voluntary 
use of technology will never be successful.,103 Mason Rice, Robert Miller, and Sujeet 
Shenoi point out that most infrastructures are privately owned and that proposed 
government mandates may be perceived as a violation of the basic rights of American 
citizens to be free from government intrusion into their private holdings.104 In her article 
“Growing Threat,” Valentina Pasquali proposes that the resistance to additional defensive 
cyber-security measures is not a result of a system owner’s disbelief in the threat but 
instead is a lesson in economics. He indicates that defensive cyber-security tools are an 
additional cost to a business’s bottom line and are not a revenue-generating tool.105 
Going further with this theme, Butler Lampson proposes that defensive security measures 
will not be embraced if they are inconvenient to use, cause a diminished operational 
system capacity (speed) or cost more than the system owner is willing to spend.106  
In Ranjan Pal and Leana Golubchik’s conference paper, “Analyzing Self-Defense 
Investments in Internet Security under Cyber-Insurance Coverage,” the theory that a 
system of mandatory cyber-security measures modeled after a mandatory system of 
insurance, when deployed across the nation’s public and private infrastructure, will 
102 Ross Anderson, Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems. 
(New York: Wiley, 2001). 
103 Valentina Pasquali, “Growing Threat,” Global Finance 27, no. 5 (May 2013): 21; Ranjan Pal and 
Leana Golubchik, “Analyzing Self-Defense Investments in Internet Security under Cyber-Insurance 
Coverage” in 2010 IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, 1–9, doi:10.1109/
ICDCS.2010.79. 
104 Mason Rice, Robert Miller, and Sujeet Shenoi, “May the U.S. Government Monitor Private 
Critical Infrastructure Assets to Combat Foreign Cyberspace Threats?” International Journal of Critical 
Infrastructure Protection 4, no. 1 (April 2011): 3–13, doi:10.1016/j.ijcip.2011.02.001. 
105 Pasquali, “Growing Threat.” 
106 Butler W. Lampson, “Computer Security in the Real World,” Computer 37, no. 6 (June 2004):  
37–46. 
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enhance our security posture.107 Pal and Golubchik argue that, if the cost of defensive 
security measures were defrayed through a partial “insurance” fee, the adoption rate by 
private industry owners would be much greater.108 Although this avenue is interesting, 
other experts disagree, stating that voluntary measures will never provide for a more 
robust defensive cyber-security stance.109 
One of the aspects of defensive cyber security proposed by DHS has been 
leveraging the support of the Department of Defense (DOD) and the National Security 
Agency (NSA). This method would appear to support the department’s defensive 
approach through access to the latest exploits utilized by the nation’s premier offensive 
cyber actors.110 In this theory, the nation’s leading cyber-attack force would provide 
cyber tools and ways to protect against them so DHS could ensure the defensive tools 
protecting our nation’s infrastructure are infallible. Ross Anderson, in his Security 
Engineering document, disputes the validity of this premise, stating that the intelligence 
and military community has no reason to provide information that could, if publically 
exposed, hamper its primary attack mission.111 Moore, Friedman, and Procaccia, in their 
paper titled “Would a Cyber Warrior Protect Us?” mathematically demonstrate, through 
Nash Equilibrium Theory, that this collaborative effort with system defenders is a non-
logical choice for the offensive cyber entities of the DOD and intelligence community. 
The DOD fears that a “zero day” exploit would be publically released and become 
worthless to them would ensure that they would resist sharing those exploits as to not be 
in their best interest.112  
As described by Nigel Martin and John Rice in an article in “Computers and 
Security,” perhaps the point of defensive technology is not necessarily to provide 
107 Pal and Golubchik, “Analyzing Self-Defense Investments.” 
108 Ibid., 2. 
109 Sofaer and Goodman, “Cyber Crime and Security,” 25; Rice, Miller, and Shenoi, “May the U.S. 
Government Monitor,” 2. 
110 O. Sami Saydjari, “Defending CyberSpace,” Computer 35, no. 12 (December 2002): 125–27. 
111 Anderson, Security Engineering, 5. 
112 Tyler Moore, Allan Friedman, and Ariel D. Procaccia, “Would a ‘Cyber Warrior’ Protect Us: 
Exploring Trade-Offs between Attack and Defense of Information Systems,” in Proceedings of the 2010 
Workshop on New Security Paradigms (New York: 2010 ACM, 2010), 85–94, doi:978-1-4503-0415-3. 
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security; instead, it is to increase the public’s trust in the systems and encourage the use 
of self-defensive security measures.113 They argue that most citizens are worried about 
cybercrime because more than 80 percent of attacks are financially motivated. They 
further argue that widespread adoption of defensive technology by private citizens would 
provide the government with increased awareness of the cyber-threat landscape and 
increased security to the networked world.114  
The existing literature indicates that the sole utilization of defensive technology 
provides a measure of security that is far from comprehensive. A purely defensive 
posture allows attackers unlimited time to identify vulnerabilities in a protected system 
and to attack that system when it is most advantageous to the attacker. To apply this 
defensive posture in a physical security setting, a countering force is required to deter an 
attack from being launched or to cause the attacker to break off the attack.  
C. OFFENSIVE (DETERRENT) OPERATIONS IN CYBER SECURITY 
In her article “At light speed: Attribution and Response to Cybercrime, Terrorism 
and Warfare,” Susan Brenner establishes that societies have always sought to maintain 
order to survive and prosper. Brenner maintains that, in the modern era, internal threats to 
order were dealt with through law enforcement, while external threats were dealt with 
through military action.115 For the purpose of this thesis, the description of cyber-attack 
deterrence obtained through offensive action refers primarily to actions conducted by law 
enforcement officers but does not discount the need for actions undertaken by the 
military or intelligence community. Any offensive action is guided by existing statute or 
U.S. government guidance and is conducted to eliminate an existing threat and result in 
increased cyber security through deterrence. This assumption is supported in M.E. 
O’Connell’s article, “Cyber Security without Cyber War,” on maritime piracy—which 
has been successfully countered by military units operating in a law enforcement 
113 Nigel Martin and John Rice, “Cybercrime: Understanding and Addressing the Concerns of 
Stakeholders,” Computers & Security 30, no. 8 (November 2011): 803–14, doi:10.1016/j.cose.2011.07.003. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Susan W. Brenner, “‘At Light Speed’: Attribution and Response to Cybercrime/Terrorism/
Warfare,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (1973-) 97, no. 2 (January 1, 2007): 379–475, 
doi:10.2307/40042831. 
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action.116 Supporting this mixing of operational mission is the approach supported by 
Elizabeth Myers, in her thesis titled “Cyber as a Team Sport: Operationalizing the Whole 
of Government Approach.”117 
The question of which offensive activity should be undertaken when responding 
to cyber threats requires careful consideration, as the emerging risks to the nation’s 
infrastructure are dynamic and maturing, and an overly broad application of regulation 
could negatively impact Internet commerce, innovation, and privacy. Since the initial 
government directives regarding securing Cyberspace, the DOD, represented by the 
National Security Agency (NSA) and the newly formed U.S. Cyber Command 
(CyberCom), moved aggressively to designate cyberspace as a new frontier for warfare 
with those agencies as the nation’s primary offensive actors.118 DOD’s aggressive 
positioning and publicizing cyberwar as an inevitable, or ongoing, event has highlighted 
the defense department’s belief that military action is the most effective tool available to 
recognize success in the government’s cyber-security mission. Significantly, the DOD 
belief runs directly opposite to DHS’s position that it is the lead agency responsible for 
the security, defense and resilience of the nation’s critical cyber-supported 
infrastructures.119 
As recorded by Anderson, a frequently promoted DOD warning is that a well-
coordinated cyber attack would ruin the nation’s critical infrastructure and result in 
irreparable damage.120 But Erik Gartzke, in his “Myth of Cyber War” article, disagrees 
with this premise, stating instead that a “Cyber Pearl Harbor” is unrealistic.121 
116 M. E. O’Connell, “Cyber Security without Cyber War,” Journal of Conflict and Security Law 17, 
no. 2 (August 8, 2012): 4, doi:10.1093/jcsl/krs017. 
117 Elizabeth A. Myers, “Cyber as a ‘Team Sport’: Operationalizing a Whole-of-Government 
Approach to Cyberspace Operations” (master’s thesis, National Defense University, 2011), 
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA545638. 
118 Levon Anderson, “Countering State-Sponsored Cyber Attacks: Who Should Lead?” in 
Information as Power: An Anthology of Selected United States Army War College Student Papers Volume 
2, eds. Jeffrey L. Groh et al. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2007), 105–22. 
119 “Preventing and Defending Against Cyber Attacks.” 
120 Anderson, “Countering State-Sponsored Cyber Attacks,” 1. 
121 Erik Gartzke, “The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War in Cyberspace Back Down to Earth,” 
International Security 38, no. 2 (October 2013): 2, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00136. 
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Additionally, in his report to Congress, Clay Wilson dismisses this concern because 
nationally significant cyber-supported infrastructure has become too dispersed and is 
supported by redundant systems.122 The review identified that many experts disagree as 
to whether any entity, including a nation-state level attacker, possesses the capabilities to 
launch an attack that could overcome the safeguard provided by the redundancy.123  
Anderson, continuing on the theory that DOD should be the primary entity in 
securing cyberspace, identifies information systems and cyberspace itself as weapons in 
the quest for global cyber control.124 Progressing along this line of reasoning, researcher 
Matthew Rivera states that cyberspace should be approached in the same way as the Cold 
War super powers, which featured the premise of deterrence through “mutually assured 
destruction.”125 William J. Lynn III, flatly dismisses this premise when he states, “Cold 
War strategies do not apply in cyberspace.”126 The idea of establishing a military 
“counterstrike” capability was also promoted by Brenner in her review of international 
laws that may permit attack activity in response to a cyber attack.127 In contrast, Moore et 
al. dispute this line of reasoning in regards to “deterrence through strength” and decided 
that offensively driven cyber units would always err on protecting their own assets and 
tools and would not publicize their capabilities to aid in deterrence.128 Additionally, O. 
Sami Saydjari argues that the militarization of cyberspace should be resisted because the 
effect of cyber weapons, whose effects can be non-linear, is difficult to predict and could 
have far reaching consequences.129  
122 Clay Wilson, Botnets, Cybercrime, and Cyberterrorism: Vulnerabilities and Policy Issues for 
Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 29, 2008), 27, http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/
oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA477642. 
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125 Matthew Rivera, “Deterrence in Cyberspace” (master's thesis, Joint Forces Staff College, June 13, 
2012), www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a562428.pdf. 
126 William J Lynn, III, “Defending a New Domain: The Pentagon’s Cyberstrategy,” Foreign Affairs, 
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Additional arguments against the militarization of cyberspace have been 
promoted by Gartzke, who disputes whether any act conducted in cyberspace constitutes 
an ‘attack” as defined by international law.130 Indeed, numerous works produced by 
military scholars have failed to identify any act conducted in cyberspace that can be 
identified as constituting an “act of war.”131 In fact, the RAND Corporation produced a 
work that unsuccessfully sought to identify what constituted an “act of war” and what the 
appropriate response should be.132 Some respected governmental leaders, including 
former DHS Assistant Secretary for Policy Stewart Baker, instead chose a different path 
and flatly dismissed the need for applicable international laws.133 The present research 
also identified a report produced by Martin Libicki, which dismisses the usefulness off a 
cyber attack in a strategic war.134  
Interestingly, the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ (CSIS) James 
Lewis also discounted the belief that militarizing cyberspace is required. Lewis, in his 
publication, “Assessing the Risks of Cyber Terrorism, Cyber War and Other Cyber 
Threats,” indicates that cyberwar is not feasible and that most threats from cyberspace 
involve cyber terrorism, espionage and crime.135 This premise is directly supported by 
O’Connell, who instead proposes that the Internet should be viewed as a “sphere of 
economic and communication activity,” the security of which, by law, is the 
responsibility of domestic law enforcement.136 Additionally, Gartzke argues that an 
international requirement of the definition of war is that an element of coercion to force 
compliance by a government must exist and that, because coercion does not exist during 
130 Gartzke, “The Myth of Cyberwar,” 8. 
131 David M. Keely, Cyber Attack! Crime or Act of War?” (master's thesis, U.S. Army War College, 
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the commission of an anonymous cyber attack, the activity cannot be viewed as an act of 
war.137  
In contrast to the effort to militarize cyberspace, the activities identified by Lewis 
and the environment described by O’Connell are internationally recognized as the 
domain of law enforcement. The view that cybercrime, cyber terror and cyber espionage 
are best dealt with through law enforcement means is supported by scholarly works.138 
To further muddy the waters, according to McHugh et al., an attacker typically has been 
characterized by the motivation for his or her attack or the risk the attacker poses to the 
victim. This methodology has been difficult to apply to threats emanating from the cyber 
world,139 but it is more easily defined in the examination of criminal statistics, where 
impact can be directly measured. The requirement to identify an attacker’s motivation to 
help decide on a proper national response is of such importance that Kristin M. Finklea 
and Catherine A. Theohary specifically mention its importance to Congress in a 
Congressional Research Report.140   
These tensions speak to one of the most important issues regarding cyber-based 
threats to U.S. infrastructure: successfully attributing the malicious action to a specific 
actor in an attempt to identify the actor’s motivation for the attack. Wilson described the 
difficulty in attribution as the major issue in identifying the intent behind the attack.141 
Further, he identified that malicious actor’s use of highly advanced cyber-attack tools and 
techniques and their tendency to operate from “safe havens” with the possibility of 
nation-state support further complicating attribution.142 Brenner also described 
attribution of the cyber attacker as one of the major hurdles in the successful law 
137 Gartzke, “The Myth of Cyberwar,” 14. 
138 Kristin M. Finklea and Catherine A. Theohary, Cybercrime: Conceptual Issues for Congress and 
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enforcement pursuit of cyber actors,143 and the difficulty in attribution is of such 
significance that it has also been highlighted in numerous reports to Congress.144  
In earlier works, Brenner promoted the idea that law enforcement provides society 
a baseline level of security and that the main mission of law enforcement is to discourage 
bad behaviors deemed unacceptable by society.145 Brenner also argued that law 
enforcement was successful against traditional crime because criminals were constrained 
by physical proximity (criminal to victim), scale (person to person) and pattern. Brenner 
further claimed that the cyber world changed those aspects of crime and that law 
enforcement has become less effective.146 Abraham Sofaer and Seymour Goodman 
disagree with this premise and indicate that law enforcement is still effective against 
cyber-based threats and does provide a deterrent effect through aggressive law 
enforcement that has adapted to the changing requirements of cyberspace.147 Myers also 
stresses that a strong deterrence policy would clearly indicate to potential attackers the 
ramifications of their activities.148  
Flowers et al., within their review of existing laws, specifically addressed the 
need for the penalty to the attacker to be severe enough to act as deterrent.149 Flowers 
shows that the main U.S. law against cyber intrusions, Title 18 United States Code 1030, 
is a cyber-security law.150  A review of surveys conducted by two leading cyber-security 
and defense firms show that the vast majority of malicious cyber activity was classified 
as financially motivated cybercrimes.151 These reports indicate that the majority of 
143 Brenner, “At Light Speed,” 28. 
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malicious cyber attacks should be dealt with through aggressive law enforcement actions 
that will result in the elimination of the threat or the deterrence of future activities.152 
Frederic Lemieux, in his article “Investigating Cyber Security Threats,” concurs 
with Brenner’s assumptions that many cybercrimes are traditional crimes committed over 
the Internet and that the ramifications of the crimes are so far reaching that they require a 
different approach to deterring them. Lemieux, however, disagrees with Brenner’s 
assumptions of non-adaptation and instead proposes that cyber-law enforcement entities 
have adapted and become proactive and preventative.153 Lemieux postulates that 
cybercrimes are still committed by humans and a human can be deterred from 
committing criminal acts when attribution can be made.154 Central to this deterrence is 
the possibility of apprehension, and the belief that cyber-law enforcement has become 
less reactive and more in line with the principles of “Intelligence Led Policing” (ILP). 
ILP is, by definition, a proactive law enforcement activity that specifically targets the 
highest levels of threats to either eliminate the threat OR harden the target of the 
attack.155 The goal of hardening the defenses calls for information derived from cyber 
investigations to be used to provide greater cyber-security awareness to our nation’s 
critical infrastructure. Even Dr. Brenner agrees that proactive law enforcement is useful 
as a method of deterrence and provides a measureable method of preventing future 
attacks.156  
D. CONCLUSION AND EXISTING GAPS 
The existing research into the threats against U.S. critical cyber infrastructure has 
generally focused on two key areas, namely defensive security utilizing technology and 
offensive operations that identifies and eliminates the actors who seek to target our cyber 
152 “2013 Data Breach Investigations Report,” Verizon Enterprise Solutions, accessed September 29, 
2013, http://www.verizonenterprise.com/DBIR/2013/. 
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systems. Most scholars believe the threats emanating from cyberspace will continue to 
grow in frequency and sophistication. Additionally, a reliance on technology-driven 
security methods, while marginally effective, is insufficient to ensure cyber security.   
Additional research is needed to evaluate the effectiveness of the defensive and offensive 
approaches, and if a deterrent effect can be quantified and proven to affect cyber threats. 
 36 
IV. ANALYSIS OF EVOLVING CYBER SECURITY MISSIONS 
AND FOCUS 
Chapter III provided an overview of the available governmental, academic, and 
private sector literature in the rapidly expanding field of cyber security best practices and 
technology. Additionally, the applicable government laws and policies, as well as the 
primary agencies, responsible for the security of the nation’s cyber supported critical 
infrastructure were reviewed and analyzed to frame the discourse between the leading 
experts regarding whether the deployment of defensive technology or offensive 
operations resulting in a deterrent effect is considered most effective in defending against 
cyber intrusions.   
Chapter IV provides an overview of the evolution of the DHS cyber security 
mission, the department’s gravitation to technology supported cyber defense and 
information sharing initiatives and the hesitation to utilize DHS law enforcement 
agencies and their lawful authorities. Additionally, the evolving cyber security missions 
of the NSA (inclusive of DOD/Cyber Command), the FBI, and the USSS are described as 
these four entities have the broadest authorities in the cyber security and enforcement 
arena.  
A. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
With the passage of the The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA), which 
formed the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and provided the department with 
its legal authorities and mission, the greater U.S. government turned its attention to 
enhancing and developing other departments.157 Although the primary mission of the 
department was to prevent terrorist attacks; lessen the nation’s vulnerability to terrorist 
attack; minimize damage from attacks; and increase the national resiliency, initially cyber 
security was a secondary concern and responsibility of DHS.158 Recognizing that many 
existing government agencies possessed homeland security related capabilities and 
157Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). 
158 Ibid. 
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authorities; HSA identified agencies that were organizationally re-aligned under the new 
department while also forming new component agencies through the combining of 
multiple existing agencies or missions.159  
Although the impetus for the formation of DHS was specifically in response to 
the terrorist threat, the inclusion of the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA), which was the primary government authority in responding to mass casualty or 
resiliency events, unknowingly provided the department a wider prism through which to 
pursue the homeland security mission.160 This expanded mission space offered the new 
department avenues of growth that quickly enabled it to grow its influence beyond 
terrorist attack prevention, response, and mitigation, and move aggressively into an “all 
hazards” approach to homeland security.161 Unfortunately, according Dara Cohen, 
Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, and Barry Weingast, this “all hazards” approach resulted in 
some DHS agencies being forced to de-emphasize their legacy missions to fulfill the new 
requirements of the department.162 
Among the 22 agencies realigned under the newly formed department were the 
U.S. Secret Service (USSS) and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), two agencies that 
struggled to retain their identities and unique history while still adding value to the new 
department. For the U.S. Secret Service, an agency that had been a valued member of the 
U.S. Treasury Department since the agency was formed in 1865, realignment to a 
department that had limited interest in financial crime investigations and 
executive/dignitary protection was tumultuous. Unrecognized by many within the agency 
during those early years in DHS, portions of the department’s rapidly evolving mission 
positioned the USSS, its cyber capabilities and financial crimes investigative authorities 
at the forefront of the growing departmental mission of cyber security operations.   
Although DHS’s initial focus on terrorism related matters and its increasing 
gravitation towards an “all hazards” approach to homeland security could appear to be an 
159 Ibid. 
160 Cohen, Cuéllar, and Weingast, “Crisis Bureaucracy.” 
161 Ibid., 26. 
162 Ibid., 27. 
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instance of “mission creep”; this research identified that the U.S. government had been 
steadily moving towards an “all hazards” approach since the 1990s. Since that time, the 
government had been gaining better understanding of the interconnectivity and 
vulnerability of the nation’s identified CIKR to terrorist attack or other disruption through 
cyberspace. As identified by Fleming and Goldstein of the Homeland Security Studies 
and Analysis Institute, the government shift reflected the realization that cyberspace 
forms the unpinning of the bulk of the nation’s CIKR including banking and finance, 
communications and transportation.163 The quickly evolving importance of cyberspace in 
our nation’s functioning, combined with the department’s CIKR-centric mission 
developed by previously identified legislation and presidential directives caused the rapid 
development of the cyber security focus of the department. Fleming and Goldstein also 
documented DHS’s determination that comprehensive cyber security measures could be 
described in three main categories: 1) System and Information Protection, 2) Information 
Sharing and 3) Incident Response.164 The development of the department’s cyber 
security efforts slowly, but demonstratively, tracked towards building new operational 
entities and away from leveraging the department’s legacy agencies such as the Secret 
Service. 
In an early indicator of problems the department and its component agencies 
would face in the future, efficiency reviews conducted in 2005 by the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) indicated that, although the HSA had designated DHS to 
lead the government’s critical infrastructure and cyber security efforts, the department 
lacked the legal authorities necessary to achieve success.165  
As referenced earlier in this thesis, President Bush’s 2008 Comprehensive 
National Cyber-Security Initiative (CNCI) was one of the first governmental documents 
issued after DHS’s creation that specifically addressed the importance of the cyber world 
163 Fleming and Goldstein, An Analysis of the Primary Authorities. 
164 Ibid., 26. 
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 39 
                                                 
in our nation’s security.166 This document set the course for the government’s cyber 
security progress through identifying the areas of concentration of efforts. In light of the 
three categories defined above, DHS’s gravitation towards technology solutions and 
building mission specific internal components seems a natural progression. Additionally, 
the CNCI directed departmental efforts toward developing government wide programs 
regarding “trusted connection” programs; Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems 
(IDS/IPS); Research and Development (R&D) of new technology; information sharing 
initiatives and other technology centric solutions.167 Although the need for law 
enforcement operations and budgetary increases for law enforcement were offered in the 
CNCI, only one of the 12 initiatives outlined within the document referenced any 
measure of deterring cyber attackers from intruding into protected systems.168  
In February 2010, with the release of the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review 
(QHSR), DHS defined the course of the department and the core mission areas that would 
receive the most scrutiny and support. This seminal document identified weapons of mass 
destruction and terrorist attacks against the homeland as the top priorities for the 
department but identified cyber threats and protecting civil liberties and privacy as the 
third focus area for department resources.169 To account for the cyber threat, the QHSR 
identified the areas of developing system monitoring tools, managing cyber risk, 
developing cyber skills and information sharing as well as developing a cyber incidence 
response plan to be of primary importance for the department.170 The department’s 
development of the U.S. Computer Emergency Response Team (U.S.-CERT) and other 
internal cyber response teams, as opposed to utilizing component agencies that already 
operated within the cyber security mission, was recognized within the Secret Service as a 
de-valuing of the agency and its mission. That same year, DHS’s Inspector General 
reviewed the U.S.-CERT program and noted that, although progress had been made 
166 “The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative.” 
167 Ibid. 
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regarding information sharing, U.S.-CERT lacked the statutory enforcement and response 
authority required for success.171  
Continuing the progression, the 2010 release of the Bottom Up Review (BUR), 
further identified the department operations and future areas of concentration and 
expansion. Although the BUR recognized the diverse mission space of the department 
including immigration, border and cyber security, financial crimes investigations, and 
terrorism, the BUR specifically referred to being authorized by statute to secure civilian 
networks, and to defend government and civilian networks.172 The BUR also designated 
the newly formed DHS-National Protection and Program Directorate (NPPD), which had 
resulted from an earlier re-organization of the National Preparedness and Protection 
Directorate, as the primary coordinating entity to secure and defend the CIKR from cyber 
attack.173 The BUR went on to highlight the efforts of the National Cyber and 
Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) and National Cyber Security Division 
(NCSD), as well as the importance of the deployment of defensive and identity 
management technology as central to the department’s efforts.174  
The department’s focus on defensive technology, development of response 
capabilities activities, and the apparent dismissal of the deterrent effect of component law 
enforcement action, was specifically acute for the USSS as the agency struggled to blend 
with the department. The department’s reliance on executive orders and presidential 
directives, which highlighted NPPD’s lack of the binding legal authority, was especially 
troubling because the USSS was statutorily authorized as one of the two law enforcement 
agencies with cyber intrusion investigation authority.175 Finally, the BUR specifically 
identified that cyber law enforcement coordination and information sharing should occur 
through the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF) operated by the FBI, 
171 U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Office of Inspector General (OIG), U.S. 
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as opposed to through it law enforcement agencies or even the department’s own 
NCCIC.176  
At that time, DHS component agencies were not the only group questioning 
whether DHS possessed the legal authority to conduct its proposed mission. Fleming and 
Goldstein, during a 2011 analysis of DHS authorities, identify that although many 
documents describe DHS as “having the lead” in cyber security, the department did not 
have the statutory authority to compel other government agencies to comply with 
departmental demands.177 That same year, the bi-partisan bill Promoting and Enhancing 
Cyber Security and Information Sharing Effectiveness Act of 2011 (HR3674) 
acknowledged that the department lack the statutory authority to conduct or succeed in its 
cyber security mission and attempted to provide those authorities.178 Later that same 
year, the bill failed to be moved from the committee and was removed from 
consideration.179  
Later that same year, the department launched a website titled “Preventing and 
Defending against Cyber Attacks” to publicize the department’s cyber security efforts.180 
In another affront to component agencies, the page explained the technology and 
information sharing programs being conducted by NPPD and failed to reference any DHS 
law enforcement or component efforts. 
The 2011 release of the Blueprint for a Secure Cyber Future continued the 
governmental mandate that cyber security must protect civil liberties and privacy while 
strengthening the critical infrastructure. Although this publication continued the call for 
increased use of defensive technology, the department again dismissed its cyber law 
176 Ibid., 41. 
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enforcement agencies by designating the NCCIC and NCIJTF as the primary cyber 
incident response entities.181  
In September 2011, DHS-OIG released another report that reviewed the 
department’s information sharing and cyber security activities. Although gains had been 
made within certain fields, the review identified that U.S.-CERT and NCCIC had poorly 
defined and misunderstood mission capabilities.182 The report also continued to identify 
that the department lacked the statutory authority to respond to and mitigate cyber threats, 
without consideration for the department’s component agencies.183 
In 2012, in another direct confirmation that the department lacked the authorities 
to conduct its cyber security mission, Senator Joseph Lieberman introduced Senate bill S 
2105, the Cyber Security Act of 2012.184 This bill, like many others before and since, 
failed to move from committee and was removed from consideration.185  
Most recently, in 2013, GAO released another audit of the department’s 
effectiveness in the cyber security mission. GAO again called for Congress to pass 
legislation granting the department statutory authorities to compel system owners’ 
compliance to mandates and cyber security initiatives.186 This GAO report also identified 
that the department lacked the authority to force other government agency’s cyber 
security compliance.187 Missing from any of these efforts or reports was recognition that 
portions of DHS, namely the USSS, was supported by the Federal Criminal Code in its 
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enforcement action and, through the issuance of subpoenas and search warrants, could 
force compliance of system owners. 
A review of the department’s cyber security budget requests provides another 
poignant indicator of the support DHS provided to NPPD to develop defensive cyber 
technology in relation to the allocation provided by the department to component 
agencies with statutory cyber security authorities, namely the USSS. According to the 
2009 DHS “Budget in Brief,” the NPPD budget request allocated $1.28B in funding and 
849 Full time equivalent (FTE) staffing positions compared to the USSS request for 
$1.63B and 6732 FTE.188 By the 2011 budget request, NPPD’s request had climbed to 
$2.36B with 2969 FTEs whereas the USSS request remained relatively flat at $1.81B and 
7,014 FTEs.189 More recently, in 2013, during the ongoing government budget crisis and 
sequestration, the NPPD request settled at $2.51B with 2,787 FTEs compared to the 
USSS request for $1.85B distributed to 7,061 FTEs.190  
B. NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
As a means of ensuring their security, nations have always sought information 
and the ability to monitor the communications of other nations and their enemies. 
Throughout the early 20th century, small military units were developed to concentrate on 
the interception and exploitation of foreign communications, a process that became 
known as communications intelligence (COMINT).191 This section reviews the 
development of the NSA, the adaptation of the agency to the developing communication 
methods of the Digital Age, and the expansion of the agency’s original mission and 
operational restrictions. From its unremarkable beginnings, the NSA has developed the 
field of COMINT, currently identified as signals intelligence (SIGINT), to become one of 
188 “2009 DHS Budget in Brief,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, February 4, 2009, 
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the most technologically advanced and effective intelligence collection agencies in the 
world which has also positioned itself at the forefront of the government’s efforts at 
countering the threat resulting from the spread of international terrorism and the 
developing cyber world. 
Following the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, in 1952 President 
Truman issued National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 9 (NSCID-9), which 
authorized the Department of Defense (DOD), under the direction of the Secretary of 
Defense, to conduct the mission of the interception, collection and analysis of the 
communications of foreign governments and individuals to support military 
operations.192 To accomplish this, NSCID-9 directed the formation of the National 
Security Agency (NSA), which was formed “to provide an effective, unified organization 
and control of the communications intelligence activities of the United States conducted 
against foreign governments [Italics added]”193 NSCID-9 also mandated that a NSA 
Director, who was required to be a U.S. military commissioned officer of at least a 3-star 
rank, would manage and direct the COMINT operations of the NSA. This directive did 
not reference the need to protect our citizens’ constitutional rights against unreasonable 
search and seizure or our right to privacy but it did stress that COMINT was to be 
directed against foreign threats.   
With the rapidly increasing use of technology and mass communication devices, 
the NSA experienced exponential growth in both the scope of its mission and its 
capabilities. In 1971, Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Lovett issued Department of 
Defense (DOD) directive S-100.20, to further define the authorities, functions and 
mission of the NSA, which was specifically identified as a separate agency within the 
DOD operating under the direction of the SECDEF.194 Due to the increase in collection 
platforms and technology exploited by the NSA, this directive renamed the overarching 
target of the NSA as SIGINT, which included COMINT (communications intelligence), 
192 Harry Truman Administration, National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 9 
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ELINT (electronic intelligence) and Telemetry Intelligence (TELINT). This rebranding 
of the targets of the agency indicates that the agency had expanded its methods of 
collection from solely communication intercepts to all methods of electronic 
exploitation.195 Finally, this directive, although specifically addressing that the NSA 
should not engage in censorship or monitoring of the press, made no reference to 
protecting the citizens’ rights were addressed.196  
The 1960s and early 1970s were a turbulent time in the U.S. as the nation 
struggled with the de-escalation of the Vietnam War, political unrest, the equal rights 
movement, and the revelation that the U.S. intelligence community (IC) had violated or 
circumvented laws at the direction of various presidential administrations to domestically 
collect information and target U.S. citizens for their constitutionally protected 
activities.197  
In 1976, the U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, 
led by Senator Frank Church, held hearings and produced a report (hereinafter “the 
Report”) to document the government’s abuses of its citizens’ rights and to offer 
guidance on intelligence activities.198 The Church Report acknowledged that few laws or 
regulations regarding the collection of intelligence targeting Americans existed and that 
the IC must be subject to the rule of law because it had grown so vast that it required 
governmental oversight.,199200 This finding was supported by a 1972 U.S. Supreme Court 
ruling, known as the Keith ruling, that although domestic intelligence collection must 
operate through the traditional legal process, Congress could establish a special court to 
review foreign intelligence surveillance operations.201 The Report also sought to ensure 
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that future administrations did not utilize the IC for political gains and mandated that no 
future executive actions or directives could counteract the commission’s findings.202  
Due to documented violations of law by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
NSA, and FBI, the Report authorized the FBI solely, under strict guidance and oversight, 
to conduct domestic intelligence activities.203 The NSA was forbidden to monitor any 
domestic communications, even for foreign intelligence purposes and the agency was not 
permitted to collect any citizen’s communication unless the collection was conducted in 
accordance with Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control Act with proper judicial 
review.204 Also contained within the report was the requirement that the NSA should 
never be permitted to request a commercial carrier to capture and provide 
communications that the NSA could not legally obtain under the Church Report 
requirements.205 Arguably, the findings of the Church Commission exposed the NSA to 
greatly increased oversight and forced the agency to adjust their collection activities into 
compliance. However, in line with developing, innovative technology, the agency 
continued to position itself aggressively to exploit new venues of collection from 
communication platforms that had yet to be developed.   
In 1978, drawing on the Keith Ruling and Church Committee hearings, the 
Congress initiated the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA) to provide judicial 
oversight to the IC.206 The FISA court judges were required, through a non-public court 
proceeding, to review an agency’s request to conduct domestic intelligence and signals 
intelligence operations. It was envisioned that, through the FISA court, the privacy and 
civil liberties of our citizens would be ensured while maintaining the focus of the IC 
towards foreign governments and adversaries.207 Within this framework, during the draw 
down from the Cold War, increasingly disbursed regionalized threats, terrorism, the 
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rapidly evolving cyber world, and online communication platforms, NSA continued to 
evolve and invest in the capability to provide more comprehensive SIGINT support to the 
U.S. government. 
In 1981, President Reagan issued Executive Order (EO) 12333, which sought to 
describe and guide U.S. intelligence activities and agencies to ensure effective, efficient, 
and lawful operations. One of the primary goals described in EO 12333 was to ensure 
that our citizens’ rights and privacies were protected during intelligence collection 
activities.208 Of particular note is that the Director of the FBI was specifically the only 
entity approved to coordinate all domestic clandestine foreign counter-intelligence 
collection through both human and human-enabled sources.209 The Director of the CIA 
meanwhile, was authorized to coordinate all foreign intelligence collection of human and 
human-enabled sources.210 NSA was solely authorized to collect, analyze and report 
signals intelligence in support of the DOD counter intelligence mission and to operate a 
domestic administrative operations to provide cover support to the other intelligence 
agency’s operations.211  
In 1993, then NSA Director J.M. McConnell issued U.S. Signals Intelligence 
Directive (USSID) 18, which described the legal compliance and minimization process 
for NSA SIGINT operations.212 The primary driver behind this document was to ensure 
that the SIGINT operations were conducted to safeguard the constitutional rights of U.S. 
persons.213 The document quotes the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution and refers to 
the U.S. Supreme Court ruling that warrantless interception of communications 
constitutes an illegal search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.214 Later 
in the directive, McConnell states that it is the policy of NSA to target and collect only 
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significant foreign intelligence communications.215 In another section, the directive 
denies collection authority in a situation where a person is not acting on behalf or at the 
direction of a foreign power, but whose actions could benefit a foreign power.216  
These previously described documents clearly indicate that, barring early missteps 
by the IC, the NSA was cognizant of the importance of the rights that form the 
underpinnings of this nation. Although volumes of classified documents and directives 
exist which will be outside the scope of this thesis, it is well documented that the NSA 
was conceived as a civilian intelligence collection agency, organizationally aligned, 
managed and supporting the DOD, with a mandate to target and collect foreign 
government and military communications. The 1990s Internet boom, proliferation and 
mass adoption of email and other Internet supported communication systems, and the 
increasingly borderless nature of cyber space changed the way the world interacted. 
Physical proximity, access, and national borders were suddenly less important to our 
daily interactions as commerce, communication, and crime, including espionage, were 
increasingly conducted through cyberspace. As communications and cyber space 
continued to evolve, the NSA was positioned to be more central to the mission of 
securing the country; a position that promised funding, staffing and authorization 
increases. But technology was not the only rapid development of the 1990s; through a 
series of terrorist attacks targeting our facilities, personnel and interests overseas, the 
nation became aware that not all physical threats emanated from hostile nations. 
On September 11, 2001, the threat from terrorism was brought into the home of 
every American, causing widespread panic and demands to ensure our citizens’ security. 
In the days immediately following the attacks of 9/11, the Bush administration 
established a framework to guide and codify the changes that he had indicated were 
neccesary in his public address following the attacks. These early decisions and efforts 
resulted in sweeping organizational and targeting changes for the U.S. intelligence 




                                                 
into citizens’ privacy in an focused effort to defeat the perceived threat from international 
terrorism.   
On October 21, 2001, the passage of the USA Patriot Act (public law 107–56) 
codified the expansion of the IC’s authorities and focused the resources of the federal 
government to our nation’s security on predominantly non-nation state enemies.217 
Among the far-reaching changes to IC authorities and missions contained within the Act 
was section 214, which amended FISA targeting requirements from being “foreign 
intelligence and international terrorism information” to “information collected that is 
likely to contain foreign intelligence information or international terrorism information 
[italics added].218 It can be argued that this small alteration decreased the NSA’s 
collection restrictions while providing a rapid expansion of opportunities that no longer 
had to testify that the target was an agent of a foreign intelligence group; in effect, being 
a criminal that may be connected to foreign intelligence was sufficient. Additionally, 
section 802 included a new definition of domestic terrorism, which is described as 
domestic acts that are 1.) Dangerous to human life and /or a violation of the criminal laws 
of the U.S. or a state and; 2.) Are intended to coerce a government or the population 
[italics added].219 However, the alterations to section 814 provided NSA with one of its 
most important tools to expand its area of operation within the developing cyberspace. 
Section 814, titled “Deterrence and Prevention of Cyber Terrorism” alters Title 18 United 
States (criminal) Code 1030 – “Fraud and related activity in connection with computers” 
to make any cyber attack which results in “damage to any computer system used by or for 
a government entity in furtherance of the administration of justice, national defense, or 
national security” [italics added].220 The addition of a national defense clause to Title 18 
USC 1030 continued to blur the lines of law enforcement and intelligence operations and 
targets. 





                                                 
In that short period after 9/11, alterations to existing criminal statues, and to the 
authorities of law enforcement, the IC, and the NSA/DOD in particular, initiated major 
changes to many aspects of our citizens’ lives and how the government interacted with 
them. Supporters and detractors all voiced opinions regarding the lawfulness and 
appropriateness of these changes but, in the aftermath of the worst terrorist attack and 
loss of life in America, the rush to identify the enemy and provide security to the 
populace was the government’s primary goal.   
This changing perspective was exemplified in a 2002 National Defense University 
article calling for allowing domestic military operations because the “frontline,” which 
had always been located in foreign locales, was now inside the homeland and should be 
considered as a “domestic battle space.”221 The speed with which military proposed this 
idea is of note because the post-9/11 period was the military’s best opportunity to propose 
a review of the Posse Comitatus Act, which prohibits the domestic use of the military 
except in very specific situations, including civil disturbance/insurrection, counterdrug 
operations, and disaster relief.222 For the NSA, a DOD aligned civilian intelligence 
agency, which had just gained additional mission spaces through the Patriot Act, the 
limits of expansion relied only on itself and how the governmental discourse could be 
shaped. 
In another step that blurred the lines between domestic and foreign operations by 
the government, on May 17, 2002, the FISA Court issued a judgment in response to a 
Department of Justice (DOJ) memorandum calling for the discontinuance of the “wall” 
between law enforcement and intelligence operations.223 This wall was the prohibition of 
sharing information received during intelligence and law enforcement operations as a 
means of ensuring that the collecting authority adhered to civil and privacy protections. 
Within the IC community, this opened up the possibility of utilizing information derived 
221 Steven J. Tomisek, Homeland Security: The New Role for Defense (Washington, DC: Institute for 
National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2002), 1. 
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from domestic operations, even though it may contain U.S. person information, to 
develop a better common operating picture with little oversight. 
Also during this time period, as described in other sections of this thesis, 
increasing numbers of respected sources began to propose and promote the possibility of 
cyber war and cyber terrorism. The basis for these assumptions was rooted in the fear that 
nation-states or cyber-terrorists could launch disruptive cyber attacks against the nation’s 
critical infrastructure because of the nation’s increasing reliance on the Internet. For 
example, a December 2002 article in Computer magazine written by O. Sami Saydjari 
proposed that the nation’s cyber supported critical infrastructure was highly vulnerable to 
cyber attack and that the president should initiate a Cyber Warfare Defense Project 
modeled after the nation’s “Manhattan Project.”224 Although the threat of cyber war or 
cyber terror was dismissed as unrealistic or ineffective by James Lewis of the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies as the decade progressed, the media increasingly 
promoted the threat of cyber terrorist attack or nation-state sponsored cyber warfare.225 
By January 2006, a letter from U.S. Attorney General (AG) Alberto Gonzalez to 
Senator William Frist, offered proof of how successfully and completely the IC, in this 
case the NSA, had asserted the legality and appropriateness of allowing the IC to operate 
domestically to ensure success in the pursuit of homeland security. Gonzalez promoted 
that the collection of any communications into, or out of, the country, which may be 
connected to terrorism or national security was lawful and consistent with civil liberties 
[Italics added].226 Interestingly, in this letter, AG Gonzalez referred to Congress’s 
authorization of the President’s deployment of the military (NSA) to conduct warrantless 
interception of communications as being consistent with presidential powers during war 
times.227 Finally, Gonzalez argued that FISA and Title III communication interception 
requirements did not apply to wartime intelligence collection that must be utilized to 
224 Saydjari, “Defending Cyber Space.” 
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ensure enduring homeland security.228 Although this letter specifically addresses 
terrorism, the blurring of the lines in an effort to provide homeland security, effectively 
allowed the NSA to operate without regard to national boundaries. When applied to 
cyberspace, this approach removed any previous collection-targeting requirement that 
required specificity instead; the NSA was now free to collect any information flowing 
through the borderless cyber world.   
The evolution of the public discourse regarding cyber war, cyber terrorism, the 
expansion of the NSA’s collection authority, and the removal of collection and operation 
restrictions, quickly progressed. In June 2009, then SECDEF Robert Gates established 
the military’s U.S. Cyber Command to defend against the perceived increasing threats to 
the U.S. government, military and commercial information systems from what was 
reported as our adversary’s rapidly developing network attack capabilities.229 Mark 
Young, in a Journal of National Security Law and Policy article, proposed that civilian 
agencies, including DHS and law enforcement, lacked the capacity to defend the country 
from national security cyber threats and that the military was the only government asset 
capable of the mission.230 Although acknowledging that Cyber Command lacked guiding 
doctrines regarding the use of cyber power and computer network operations, Young 
proposed that authorizing DOD to lead the nation’s cyber security efforts was proper 
because cyberspace must be treated like the other war fighting domains of sea, air, land, 
and space.231 In addition to the previously described expansion of the NSA’s intelligence 
collection authorities, the framing of cyber space as a military sphere of operation also 
benefitted the agency since it was a civilian intelligence agency aligned within the U.S. 
military structure.  
Further ensuring the NSA’s premier positioning within the government’s cyber 
security apparatus, on May 21, 2010, SECDEF Gates appointed the Director of the NSA, 
228 Ibid. 
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Army General Keith Alexander, to assume “dual hatted” command of U.S. Cyber 
Command.232 By placing a single commander over both the civilian intelligence agency, 
with its unique authorities and capabilities, and the military’s cyber attack forces, the 
lines of distinction were removed. Opponents proposed that this allowed for the General 
to utilize whichever portion of his command as necessary to operate within cyberspace 
without regard for national boundaries, civil liberties, and the Posse Comitatus Act, while 
placing too much power within one organization.233  
Supporting opponents’ fears, only two years later, in November 2012, President 
Obama issued PPD-12 (classified), as reported by the Washington Post. According to the 
Post, PPD-12 authorized U.S. Cyber Command to enact more aggressive efforts in 
defense of government and private computer networks [italics added].234 And a few 
months later, on February 12, 2013, President Obama issued PPD-21, Critical 
Infrastructure Security and Resilience. Although it does not refer specifically to the NSA, 
PPD-21 authorizes the IC, under the direction of the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence (ODNI), to exercise its authority over national security cyber systems.235 In 
light of the previous administration’s defining of critical infrastructure, including cyber 
space and infrastructure supporting cyber systems, as a national security issue, the 
inference could be argued that this PD authorizes the NSA to operate within private 
computer networks.  
As described, the development of the NSA, an agency that operates as both a 
civilian intelligence (SIGINT) collection agency and a military organization, has placed 
the agency at the forefront of the nation’s cyber security efforts resulting in exponential 
growth of its structure and funding. The world’s increasing reliance on the Internet and 
cyber supported infrastructures allowed the NSA to develop its influence within the 
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government, and within private cyber supported systems. The NSA’s development of 
domestic collection operations, arguably in direct violation of existing laws and 
guidelines, requires the nation to decide if the domestic utilization of a military or 
intelligence agency is a violation of long-held American values. Is the collection and 
access of citizens’ personal information from the Internet by an U.S. intelligence agency 
a further violation of our citizens’ right to privacy?  Future chapters will discuss these 
questions in more detail. 
C. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 
Although common in other countries, a national police force has never existed in 
the U.S. due to our underlying principles of distributed power, state’s rights and limiting 
federal powers. However, as the nations developed, crimes which crossed state borders 
became commonplace and, to investigate those crimes and apprehend the criminals 
responsible, numerous federal law enforcement agencies were formed. In keeping with 
our underlying values, these federal agencies were authorized specific investigative 
missions and strict limitations on their operations. Law enforcement officers for these 
agencies came to be known as “special agents,” a title which refers to the agent’s limited 
investigative authorities and not their operational capabilities. The Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) has developed to become the most recognized law enforcement 
agency in the U.S. The FBI is unique among U.S. law enforcement due to its dual 
mission of criminal investigation and national security (intelligence collection), which 
has allowed the agency the opportunity to redirect its assets and efforts to counter the 
most pressing enforcement issues of the day. These dual, sometimes-competing missions 
have, at times, caused the agency difficulties in the proper allocation of resources, agency 
infighting and overreach of authority.   
Although, at that time, mission-specific federal criminal investigative agencies 
already existed, in 1908, U.S. Attorney General (AG) Charles Bonaparte hired 10 U.S. 
Secret Service agents to form the nucleus of an investigative agency operating under the 
direction and authority of the Department of Justice and the Attorney General. This new 
investigative agency became known as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and was 
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given the authority to investigate crimes involving inter-state criminal violations under 
the authority of the Attorney General.236 Although some in the government feared the 
FBI would become too powerful due to its rapid expansion, in the buildup to World War 
I, the agency was given the mission of investigating draft resistors and other violators of 
the Espionage Act of 1917.237 This early focus on domestic national security 
investigations, where the FBI sought to document subversive or foreign intelligence 
actors, including reported communist and Nazi sympathizers formed the underpinnings of 
the agency’s dual mission.238  
In the following years, and under the direction of long-serving Director J. Edgar 
Hoover, the FBI grew and expanded its investigative mission to include all federal crimes 
not specifically authorized to another federal agency, as well as all domestic national 
security operations.239 Through many investigative successes, the FBI developed a 
worldwide reputation for cutting edge law enforcement techniques while apprehending 
bank robbers, mafia figures, kidnappers and foreign spies. These successes positioned the 
FBI to continue to grow while attaining additional investigative authorities. During this 
time period, the agency concentrated the majority of its resources on criminal 
investigations, with little emphasis on intelligence collection. 
With the onset of World War II and the expansion of regimes deemed threatening 
to American democracy, Director Hoover directed his agents to investigate any activities 
which he designated a subversive act or a threat to the nation’s security. Reportedly, 
during this time period, the FBI greatly enhanced its use of domestic wire-tapping, 
surreptitious interception and documentation of citizens’ communications, and 
cataloguing of citizens’ “subversive” activities.240 By the passage of the National 
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Security Act of 1947, the government had formally recognized that the Intelligence 
Community (IC) included externally facing military and intelligence agencies as well as 
domestically aligned investigative agencies led by the FBI.241 During these years, the 
Bureau’s intelligence collection mission became the agency’s primary mission, a move 
that positioned the agency to receive increased funding and additional expansion.   
The post-war years through the 1950s, ‘60s, and ‘70s saw the rise of the perceived 
threat of the expansion of communism abroad. Through these times, the FBI continued to 
investigate criminal acts under its broad jurisdiction as well as to conduct domestic 
counter-intelligence operations targeting groups deemed subversive to this country, 
namely groups supporting communism. Unfortunately, during this time period, the nation 
was experiencing disruptive challenges to the historical norms of the society as it 
wrestled with racial and sexual equality, unpopular wars overseas, political corruption 
and the existential threat of nuclear war. During this time, Director Hoover initiated a 
program known as COINTELPRO, which utilized the FBI’s national security and law 
enforcement authorities to conduct intelligence collection operations against members of 
legitimate groups, public figures and citizens in violation of existing laws and our 
citizens’ constitutional rights.242  
The June 1968, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act was passed in an 
effort to provide guidance to law enforcement in their duties and to curb the rising gun 
violence in the country. Of importance for the FBI, the Act provided large budget 
increases for the agency to expand its operations. Additionally, Title III of the Act 
recognized that government agencies, namely the FBI and NSA, had utilized wiretaps 
(SIGINT) inappropriately and violated the privacy rights of American citizens.243 The 
Act also outlined the means, methods and judicial oversight that the government could 
employ domestically to monitor the communications of its citizens while still protecting 
innocent party’s communication.244 The Act recognized that the government’s increasing 
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exploitation of communications and other technology could degrade the privacy rights of 
citizens if not subjected to proper oversight.    
In response to the violations uncovered regarding COINTELPRO and other IC 
domestic intelligence activities, the bi-partisan Church Commission was initiated to 
investigate the violations by the government, recommend guidance, and pass legislation 
to ensure the values of our nation were protected.245 Though the earlier section detailing 
civil rights violations by the NSA may indicate that the NSA was the only overreaching 
agency examined by the Church Commission, the FBI had also developed ways to blend 
its law enforcement and national security/ intelligence authorities and capabilities to 
violate citizens’ civil rights through electronic and physical surveillance. At the outset of 
the hearings, the commission recognized that certain agencies, including the FBI, had 
authorities that were so extensive that they had to be clearly understood to judge if the 
intelligence community had to be reformed.246 Additionally, the commission identified 
that no guiding policies existed to limit the FBI’s domestic intelligence operations, a 
mission that the bureau had undertaken at the direction of Director Hoover and various 
Attorneys General (AG).247 Because of the lack of formal guidelines, the commission 
based many of its findings on the core national values of civil liberty protection and 
separation of powers. Quoting former  AG Stone in 1924, the commission voiced a fear 
of any agency that could become a secret police could abuse its powers and become 
uncontrollable.248  
Specifically the commission noted that the FBI had secretly intercepted written 
communications and opened more than 100,000 first class letters to develop files and 
investigations on an undocumented number of Americans with no proof of wrongdoing 
although those citizens had been designated by the agency to be “rounded up” in the 
event of an undefined “national emergency.”249 The commission also noted that FBI 






                                                 
counterintelligence (CI) managers felt that existing laws and court decisions had “tied 
their hands” and decreased their ability to be effective against national security threats. 
According to one senior FBI official, the Bureau believed that breaking the law and 
violating citizens’ rights was justified because the national security of the nation 
demanded it.250 The commission declared that COINTELPRO and the actions of the IC 
“indisputably degraded our free society.”251  Finally, the commission recommended that 
only the FBI, with strict judicial oversight, would be authorized to conduct domestic 
intelligence activities including surveillance, electronic interception of communications, 
and the physical monitoring of foreign agents, and that those activities should never 
hamper criminal investigations which were the proper method to deal with domestic 
espionage conducted by foreign actors.252  
The Church Commission, which issued its findings in 1976 shortly after the death 
of Director Hoover, caused sweeping changes within the FBI in its domestic intelligence 
operations. The commission’s findings prompted then AG Levin to issue the first 
formalized guidance to the FBI regarding how it should conduct its domestic intelligence 
operations. Notably, the agency was required to certify that a targeted individual or group 
was radicalized and involved in breaking the law or violent criminality rather than mere 
suspicion.253 These guidelines are credited as the reason that between 1973 and 1976, the 
number of FBI domestic security investigations dropped from over 21,000 cases to just 
626.254  
In 1978, the passage of the FISA Act, with its clear definition of electronic 
surveillance and interception, and the establishment of the FISA court to review domestic 
electronic surveillance operations conducted by the FBI, seemed to ensure citizens’ civil 
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authorized by a panel of judges and only target foreign intelligence targets ensured that 
domestic operations would continue to be conducted by law enforcement agencies in 
compliance within existing interception laws but, as developments in technology, 
communication methods and interception capabilities continued, the application of the 
existing laws struggled to adapt.   
President Reagan’s 1981 issuance of EO 12333 further defined the collection 
responsibilities of the IC, mandated that the FBI was the sole agency authorized to 
conduct domestic intelligence activities, and protected our citizens’ civil liberties from 
abuse by government actions.256 The EO mandated that any domestic collection missions 
undertaken by the FBI be within the guidance of the AG to ensure operational personnel 
received proper oversight and operated within established lawful guidelines.257  
The 1984 passage of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act represented the 
government’s growing awareness of the developing cyber world and the possibility that 
criminals could leverage it to commit crimes. This Act was also the first comprehensive 
revision of the U.S. Criminal Code since the early 1900s and contained provisions to 
account for the increasing use of technology in our daily lives.258 Although the Act 
explicitly authorized the U.S. Secret Service to investigate credit card and computer 
fraud, the FBI’s broad investigative authorities granted under Title 28, section 533 to also 
positioned the agency to develop an expertise in computer crimes.259  The Act designated 
the improper accessing of a protected computer system a violation of federal law under 
Title 18 USC 1030.260  
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The disintegration of the Soviet Union substantially decreased the Bureau’s 
counter-intelligence mission and the agency’s law enforcement mission again took 
precedence in resource allocation. To respond to the nation’s increasing emphasis on 
stemming the flow of drugs into the country and the threat posed by organized crime, the 
bureau re-established itself as the nation’s leading law enforcement agency. Throughout 
the 1980s and ‘90s, international terrorism was generally perceived by the American 
public to be a threat to our citizens in other parts of the world with few acts or threats 
being identified domestically. In response to attacks against our citizens and military 
overseas, FBI Director Webster made counterterrorism the fourth national priority and, in 
the following years, many investigations involving attacks against Americans overseas 
were undertaken by the Bureau.261 Following the first terror attack against the World 
Trade Center in 1993, then FBI Director Freeh identified that terrorism was a major 
threat to our national security however; the Bureau continued to allocate the majority of 
its resources to traditional criminal investigations and approached terrorism in a de-
centralized fashion.262  
As described elsewhere in this thesis, the 9/11 terror attacks caused widespread 
panic and demands on the government to ensure our citizens’ security. In the days 
immediately following the attacks of 9/11, the Bush administration codified the changes 
that he had indicated were neccesary in his public address following the attacks. These 
early efforts also resulted in sweeping organizational and targeting changes for the U.S. 
intelligence program as well as the federal law enforcement community. For the FBI, the 
9/11 attacks resulted in intense scrutiny and oversight as some felt that the agency had 
failed to protect the country by allocating too much of its resources towards reactive law 
enforcement activities while dminishing its national security responsibilties.263 The post-
9/11 scrutiny of the FBI rivaled the Church Commission/COINTELPRO period and 
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forced the agency to concentrate its efforts on its counterterror and national security 
missions with less resources being allocated toward criminal investigation.    
As described earlier, the passage of the USA Patriot Act continued the sweeping 
changes to the operational and legal guidance for both law enforcement and the 
intelligence community. As reported by Jaeger, Bertot and McClure, the ‘s changes to 
FISA requirements and other guidelines for the FBI, with its unique law enforcement and 
national security missions, resulted in changes which are still developing a decade 
later.264  Most notably, Section 206 and 207, expanded the definition of  “foreign power 
or intelligence” to include U.S. citizens if the government felt that they were affiliated 
with a foreign power, thereby removing any FISA protections for U.S. citizens.265 
Additionally, the target of the investigation or intelligence operation no longer needed to 
be involved in a violation of federal law and any information gathered could be shared 
with law enforcement and intelligence agencies.266 The increased sharing between law 
enforcement agencies, operating under laws designed to ensure our citizens’ privacy, and 
intelligence agencies focused on foreign actors with no privacy considerations, instantly 
removed Church Commission era prohibitions designed to protect U.S. civil liberties.267 
This prohibition on sharing between law enforcement and intelligence was commonly 
referred to as “the wall.”  Additionally, as reported elsewhere, Section 814 approved the 
application of 18 USC 1030 (CFAA Act) to acts of “cyber terrorism” although the 
definition required the loss of one life due to the act.268  
In 2002, the FBI, recognizing that the rapidly developing cyber world formed the 
foundation of the nation’s critical infrastructures and were susceptible to cyber attack or 
cyber terrorism; formed a dedicated Cyber Division to integrate the national security and 
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cyber investigative missions into a unified methodology.269 The blending of the Bureau’s 
national security and criminal investigative missions was evident in the Cyber Division 
mission statement to combat cyber-terrorism, hostile foreign intelllignce action conducted 
over the Internet, and cyber crime.270 Additionally, the FBI initiated a cyber-specific 
agent training program to ensure its worlforce was prepared to operate effectively in the 
cyber world.271 
As refererenced earlier in this thesis, the 2003 release of the President’s National 
Strategy to Secure Cyber Space contained many mandates which indicated the 
government’s growing awareness of the cyber threats facing the nation. Specifically for 
the FBI, the Strategy indicated that the FBI and DoJ lead the national effort to investigate 
and prosecute cyber crime.272 Although the Strategy recognized that many cyber attacks 
are crimes, it indicated that national security and law enforcement must play a role in the 
nation’s cyber-security stance but that law enforcement action offered the best 
opportunity to identify and apprehend the responsible attacker.273  Finally, the Strategy 
called on the FBI to adopt an “Intelligence Led Policing” model to proactively identify 
and disrupt criminal, intelligence or counter-intellligence cyber operations in the U.S..274 
In 2004, the long awaited 9/11 Commission Report was released. The report 
identified failures in the government’s preparedness and response to the 9/11 attacks. 
Although the IC was collectively condemned for failing to successfully identify the 
terrorist’s intent to attack the U.S. homeland, the FBI was widely criticized for having a 
lack of imagination to envision the terrorist’s plans.275 The Report identified that the 
FBI’s National Security structure was designed for Cold War threats and as unprepared to 
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counter the threat posed by terrorism.276 Additional allegations noted in the report 
include that the FBI lacked the ability to collect information gleaned in field office 
investigations, and was operating as an investigative entity more interested in 
prosecutions of past attacks than an intelligence collection agency seeking to thwart an 
attack.277  The report further called on FBI to re-allocate personnel to develop a national 
security workforce which was to concentrate specifically on intelligence and national 
security issues resulting from terrorism.278 Finally, the Report spent considerable effort 
identifying the inability of law enforcement information to be shared with the IC as a 
primary reason that the terrorist plot was not identified and interupted. 
Following quickly behind the Commission report, The Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 required the national security mission of the FBI to 
take precedence over the criminal investigative responsibilities. The Act required all 
agents to receive mandatory counter-intelligence training and to be designated as certified 
intelligence officers.279 Additionally, the agency was required to allocate large portions 
of its budget to intelligence and counter-terror activities while designating intelligence  
specific career tracks for personnel who would not be required to be invovled in the 
agency’s traditional criminal investigative core mission.280    
In 2008, Attorney General Mukasey issued sweeping new guidelines, referred to 
as the Mukasey Guidelines, to guide the agency’s operations and new, national security 
centric role.281  According to the guidelines, the separation of criminal and national 
security cases and information, and the designation of personnel as counter-
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terror/intelligence or criminal investigators would be discontinued.282 The guidelines also 
designated computer intrusions conducted by foreign entities, and not necessarily foreign 
governments, to be designated and investigated as a national security issue.283 The 
mandatory sharing of criminal investigative information and evidence with classified 
information and intelligence agencies represented the final step over the Church 
Commission “wall” which had existed to protect the privacy of the public and was 
resisted by many in the criminal investigations field. The removal of the wall was also 
unsettling to many civil liberties groups who believed that the role of the judiciary and 
law enforcement would be diminished in relation to intelligence and counter-intelligence 
requirements and that intelligence investigative authorities would be utilized to by-pass 
normal criminal procedures designed to protect citizens’ civil liberties.284  
In the FBI Cyber Division, the “over the wall” sharing authorized by the Patriot 
Act, encouraged by the 9/11 Commission, and mandated by the AG was evident in the 
creation of the FBI administered National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF) 
which was incorporated into the 2008 release of the CNCI.285 The NCIJTF was 
envisioned to serve as a multi-agency national focal point for counter-intelligence, 
intelligence, counter-terrorism and law enforcement cyber operations to quickly integrate 
and share cyber threat related information.286 The CNCI identified that many security 
experts were concerned that hostile cyber actors would progress from committing crimes 
online to taking actions that would disrupt or destroy cyber supported critical 
infrastructures such as telecommunications or the financial services sector through the 
deployment of undefined cyber weapons.287 
As this section indicates, throughout its history the FBI successfully endured 
many periods of operational success followed by allegations of overreach and intense 
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scrutiny resulting in re-organization or resource re-allocation. The decade after the 9/11 
attacks represents the most recent time period for the agency as it refocused its resources 
and efforts from reactive traditional criminal investigations, to intelligence driven 
counter-terror or national security efforts, and finally towards the developing cyber 
world. As reflected in a website detailing the FBI’s changing focus in the post-9/11 
decade, the Bureau changed from a case based, law enforcement-centric contributor to 
the IC, to a hybrid law enforcement/national security, threat driven, full IC partner 
focusing on terrorism and cyber threats.288 To accomplish this re-organization, the 
Bureau increased its staffing from approximately 27,000 employees to approximately 
35,000 employees including a 200% increase in cyber trained personnel and intelligence 
analysts, while the agency’s budget increased from approximately $3.8 billion USD to 
almost $9 billion.289  
Perhaps the most effective indicators of the Bureau’s increasing emphasis on 
cyber threats from its counter-intelligence and counter-terror focus are the statements of 
its leadership in the media and during Congressional testimony. In March 2012, then 
Director Robert Mueller was invited to provide the keynote address to the widely 
attended annual RSA Cyber Conference in San Francisco, CA. In this speech, Director 
Mueller emphasized the cyber threat from national security and state sponsored attackers, 
cyber terrorism, organized crime groups, and hacktivists.290 Mueller also highlighted the 
detailed the growth of the NCIJTF and the FBI’s recognition that, although terror was the 
agency’s primary focus, cyber threats clearly represented the future top threat and priority 
for the agency and that success for the agency required the successful attribution of the 
attacks.291  
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More recently, in May 2013, FBI Cyber Division Assistant Director (AD) Joseph 
Demarest emphasized the growing cyber threat to the U.S. critical infrastructure from 
foreign intelligence and nation-state sponsored actors, terrorism, organized crime and 
hacktivists during his testimony to the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and 
Terrorism.292 During this testimony, AD Demarest described the FBI’s “NextGen Cyber” 
program that sought to prepare the agency for future cyber threats that would soon be the 
top issue for the agency. For evidence, AD Demarest described the agency’s initiation of 
fully staffed and funded Cyber Task Forces (CTF) in each of the FBI’s 56 Field  
Offices (FO) which were modeled after the successful FBI administered Joint Terror 
Task Force (JTTF) program; plans to expand the NCIJTF to include foreign law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies; and the deployment of a cyber intrusion reporting 
web portal known as “IGuardian” which was also modeled after the JTTF “Guardian” 
web portal.293  
Shortly thereafter, in June 2013, FBI Executive Assistant Director (EAD) Richard 
McFeeley testified before the Senate Appropriations Committee regarding the 
preparations the agency was undertaking to prepare for future cyber threats. EAD 
McFeeley testified that, between 2002 and 2012, the FBI had experienced an 84% 
increase in intrusion investigations and followed with a funding request for 152 
additional cyber-specific positions to help counter the growing threat.294 Additionally, 
McFeeley described the interagency development of a formalized “lanes in the road” 
document for U.S. government cyber security operations detailing the roles and 
responsibilities of the NSA, FBI and DHS.295   
Most recently, newly appointed FBI Director James Comey described the 
agency’s perception of the threats faced by the country in his November 2013 testimony 
292 Joseph Demarest, “Responding to the Cyber Threat,” FBI, May 8, 2013, http://www.fbi.gov/news/
testimony/responding-to-the-cyber-threat. 
293 Ibid. 
294 Richard McFeeley, “Cyber Security: Preparing for and Responding to the Enduring Threat,” FBI, 




                                                 
to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Director 
Comey identified intelligence driven counter terrorism as the agency’s primary mission 
but posited that, in the near future, the agency would be required to re-allocated the 
majority of its resources and budget to countering cyber threats as they became the most 
pervasive threat.296  Director Comey also reported on the FBI’s partnership with DHS 
and the NSA to co-chair the Enduring Security Framework (ESF) which sought to bring 
together the top leaders of private industry and the government to identify cyber threats 
issues and work together to counter those threats in the most effective method.297  
As this section indicates, the history of the FBI includes many operational and 
organizational successes that positioned the agency to be the preeminent law enforcement 
and national security agency in the country. Between those successes however there have 
been instances of overreach and illegal behavior that resulted in Congressional scrutiny, 
reorganization or the redirection of the agency’s mission. The decade after the 9/11 
attacks represents the most recent time period for the agency as it refocused its resources 
and efforts from reactive, traditional criminal investigations to intelligence driven 
counter-terror or national security efforts and finally towards the understanding that the 
developing cyber world represented the future of all operations. With its broad authorities 
and capabilities, the FBI will represent an integral part of the government’s cyber security 
effort into the future. 
D. U.S. SECRET SERVICE  
In 1806, due to the widespread counterfeiting of currency in the United States, 
which threatened the stability of the newly formed nation, counterfeit detection and 
suppression was delegated to the U.S. Marshals and district attorneys through the 
Enforcement of Counterfeiting Prevention Act.298 In 1860, the responsibility for the 
nation’s currency and financial infrastructure was transferred to the U.S. Treasury 
296 James Comey, “Homeland Threats and the FBI’s Response,” FBI, November 14, 2013, 
http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/homeland-threats-and-the-fbis-response. 
297 Ibid. 
298 Shawn Reese, U.S. Secret Service: An Examination and Analysis of Its Evolving Mission 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 31, 2008), 8. 
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Department and, by 1862; the nation had adopted a unified national currency.299 Shortly 
thereafter, in 1865, due to ineffective enforcement by the Marshals, the Secret Service 
Division (SSD) of the Treasury Department was formed to suppress the continued 
widespread counterfeiting of U.S. Currency, estimated at over one third of all currency in 
circulation, and to defend the nation’s nascent financial infrastructure.300 The SSD was 
very effective in its enforcement efforts, and in 1867, Congress authorized the SSD to 
investigate “frauds against the government” and other violations a directed.301  
During those early years of operation, the SSD, which was renamed the U.S. 
Secret Service (USSS) after achieving stand-alone status within the Treasury Department, 
became the preferred agency to conduct a wide range of investigations, including 
espionage and smuggling, at the direction of the President and Congress. The agency, in 
line with its original mission, continued to specialize in financial crimes investigations as 
its core investigative mission.   
In 1901, shortly after the assassination of President McKinley, the USSS was 
informally requested to provide protection for the U.S. President, a duty that was 
statutorily authorized in 1913 and for which the agency became most widely 
recognized.302 Over the next 60 years, the USSS protective mission continued to expand 
to include U.S. Presidents and their families, Vice Presidents and their families, 
Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates, visiting foreign heads of state and others as 
authorize by executive order.303 Also during this time, the agency’s authority to conduct 
its diverse, yet complimentary, investigative and protective functions was codified under 
Title 18, Section 3056 of the United States Criminal Code (USC).304 
299 “United States Secret Service: Criminal Investigations,” United States Secret Service, accessed 
June 7, 2014, http://www.secretservice.gov/criminal.shtml. 
300 Reese, U.S. Secret Service: An Examination and Analysis, 8. 
301 “United States Secret Service: Criminal Investigations.” 
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303 Ibid. 
304 18 U.S.C. 3056 - Powers, Authorities, and Duties of United States Secret Service, United States 
Criminal Code, vol. 18, 2012, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granule/USCODE-2011-title18/USCODE-2011-
title18-partII-chap203-sec3056. 
 69 
                                                 
Throughout its history, regardless of the public’s perception that the agency was 
predominantly an executive protection agency, the USSS continued to serve as the 
primary investigators of criminal violations against the nation’s financial and banking 
systems through proactive investigations and leveraging technology as it developed. 
Although the agency periodically was requested to assist other law enforcement entities 
fulfill their missions, the USSS concentrated its efforts on developing a financial crimes 
investigation specialty, always with a goal of protecting the nation’s financial 
infrastructure. 
To address developing alternate payment systems, the Comprehensive Crime 
Control Act of 1984 extended the USSS’s primary investigative authority to access 
device fraud (Title 18 USC 1029) and, in recognition of the effect developing technology 
would have on the nation’s financial systems, Computer Fraud (Title 18 USC 1030).305 
Additionally, recognizing that statutes were required to account for cyber-supported 
crimes such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, Congress passed the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 (CFAA) which authorized the USSS concurrent 
investigative jurisdiction with the FBI for violation of Title 18 USC 1028 (identity theft), 
and Title 18 USC 1030 amendments classifying computer intrusions, and crimes 
committed against federally insured financial institutions.306  
The passage of Title 18 USC 1030, and enforcement authorization being 
concurrently provided to the USSS and FBI, provided both agencies with very broad 
authority to investigate or respond to any cyber intrusion into any protected computer 
system. 18 USC 1030 has been designated as a “cyber security law….which protects 
federal computers, bank computers and computers connected to the Internet.”307 As both 
agency’s developed their cyber investigative missions, this statute provided both with the 
authority to conduct cyber security activities in furtherance of both law enforcement and 
305 “United States Secret Service: Criminal Investigations.” 
306 Wikipedia, s.v. “Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,” accessed May 29, 2014, http://en.wikipedia.org/
w/index.php?title=Computer_Fraud_and_Abuse_Act&oldid=610122220. 
307 Charles Doyle, Cybercrime: An Overview of the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Statute and 
Related Federal Criminal Laws (CRS Report R42659) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 
January 27, 2010), 2. 
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cyber protective missions far beyond the lawful capabilities of other cyber security 
entities.   
Since the passage of the CFAA and, as cyber-enabled crimes continued to evolve, 
the USSS adapted its capabilities to account for changing technologies that threatened the 
nation’s critical financial infrastructure.   As the financial sector became more reliant on 
cyber technologies and the cyber-based threats became more pervasive, the USSS has 
consistently increased its investment in its cyber-investigative and protective capabilities. 
But by 1995, the USSS recognized that technology developments, and the rapid adoption 
of those technologies by the financial sector, would quickly outpace the agency’s 
capability to achieve success. To account for this, the USSS developed a first-of-its-kind 
trusted partnership with the private sector, law enforcement, and academia in a task force 
approach to effectively share threat information, cyber intelligence and cyber security 
best practices. This model, which was quickly emulated throughout government, became 
known as the Electronic Crimes Task Force (ECTF) model.308 Over the next six years, 
the ECTF became the hallmark of the agency’s method of working in trusted partnership 
with the financial industry and other entities to fight cyber crime and protect the nation’s 
critical infrastructures. 
In 2001, the USSS was still aligned within the U.S. Treasury Department, where 
its financial crimes expertise and consistent, cutting-edge success in financial and cyber 
investigations were recognized.   However, following the attacks of September 11, 2001, 
the U.S. government sought to re-organize their capability and re-establish the confidence 
of the American public. During this turbulent time, many new threats were identified and 
sweeping organizational changes were made to the government’s operations and 
structure.   
The USA Patriot Act, passed on October 26, 2001, called for the nationwide 
expansion of the USSS Electronic Crime Task Force (ECTF) model, which was 
identified as a successful method of investigating the terrorist use of cyber technologies 
and the prevention of attacks against the nation’s financial infrastructure through 
308 “About the U.S. Secret Service Electronic Crimes Task Forces,” United States Secret Service, 
accessed June 8, 2014, http://www.secretservice.gov/ectf_about.shtml. 
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aggressive enforcement and information sharing among the trusted partners.309 While the 
USSS worked to expand the ECTF network, it was also directed to utilize its expertise in 
physical protection combined with its cyber investigative specialties to provide support to 
other cyber-supported critical infrastructures. Within the financial sector however, 
portions of the  that mandated widespread sharing of information gleaned from Secret 
Service investigations, and the corollary expansion of national security investigations, 
were met with resistance, as private industry perceived the government was seeking 
access to corporate data integral to their business model. 
On November 25, 2002, in what would forever change the mission and duties of 
the USSS, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was formed with the passage the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002  (HSA), and the further passage of significant legislation 
to enable the homeland security mission.310 Of importance for the USSS cyber mission, 
Title 18 USC 1030, which was rapidly becoming a core USSS violation, was amended to 
allow for a broader application of the “protected computer system” definition and for 
increased sentences due to the damage caused to the system.311 However, most 
importantly for the USSS, through Subtitle C of the HSA, the function, personnel, assets 
and obligations of the Secret Service were transferred from the Secretary of the Treasury 
to the Secretary of Homeland Security although the HSA mandated that the USSS was to 
remain a distinct agency.312  
As one of the 22 agencies re-aligned under the newly formed DHS, the USSS 
struggled to retain its identity and unique history while still adding value to the new 
department. Many within the USSS felt that the agency had been a valued member of the 
U.S. Treasury Department since the agency was formed in 1865, and resisted the re-
alignment to a department that appeared to have limited interest in financial crime 
investigations and executive/dignitary protection. But, as shown during this thesis, 
portions of the department’s rapidly evolving mission positioned the USSS and its cyber 
309 USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
310Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). 
311 Ibid., 22. 
312 Ibid., 90. 
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investigative and protective capabilities and authorities at the forefront of the growing 
departmental mission of cyber security operations. 
Over the next decade, although little cyber investigative legislation was passed or 
required, the USSS continued to invest heavily in its cyber capabilities to support both its 
investigative and protective missions. As with the FBI, perhaps the most effective 
measure of the agency’s growing cyber focus are the public statements of USSS and DHS 
leadership in both interviews and testimony. 
On April 3, 2003, during a hearing titled: “Fighting Fraud: Improving Information 
Security,” USSS Special Agent in Charge (SAIC) Tim Caddigan testified on the 
importance of the USSS cyber capabilities to protect the nation’s financial infrastructure 
and information systems to the Committee on Financial Services.313 Specifically, 
Caddigan referenced the service’s concentration on protecting the nation’s financial and 
critical infrastructures from cyber-based threats as well as specific successes the agency 
had accomplished in detecting and preventing attacks against the banking systems.314 
Caddigan also reported that the USSS had responded to the mandate of the Patriot Act to 
expand the NY ECTF model and had initiated eight  ECTFs throughout the country to 
assist in the effort.315 Caddigan further testified that the agency had developed the 
Critical Systems Protection Initiative (CSPI), which leveraged its cyber investigative 
trained personnel to utilize their knowledge of adversarial and malicious cyber activity in 
support of the agency’s protective mission through the prevention of cyber attacks which 
could cause physical effects and affect the integrity of the USSS protective mission. 
According to Caddigan, the agency had successfully utilized CSPI to secure the 2002 Salt 
Lake Olympics.316 Following this deployment, CSPI was recognized within both the 
313 Fighting Fraud: Improving Information Security: Joint Hearing Before the House Subcommittee 
on Financial Institutions And Consumer Credit of the Committee on Financial Services, 108th Cong., 1 






                                                 
USSS and DHS as proof that the Service’s financial crimes and cyber capabilities offered 
a scalable resource to assist DHS in securing the nation’s critical infrastructure.  
Shortly thereafter, on September 16, 2003, DHS Assistant Secretary for 
Infrastructure Protection (IP) Robert Liscouski testified before the Subcommittee on 
Cybersecurity, Science, and Research and Development, regarding DHS’ newly formed 
National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) and the department’s cyber security activities. 
In a contentious meeting which included allegations regarding DHS’ lacking cyber 
security focus and the ineffectiveness of the United States Computer Emergency 
Response Team (U.S.-CERT), Liscouski acknowledged that DHS/NCSD was required to 
provide cyber security for the nation’s critical infrastructure.317 Additionally, Liscouski 
testified that although DHS may not have sufficient department-level protective 
authorities, through the USSS, the department’s cyber and physical protection authorities 
were very broad.318 Finally, in acknowledging that the USSS was the preeminent cyber 
financial crime experts, Liscouski agreed that DHS planned on relying on the USSS’ 
cyber authorities and workforce to achieve success.319  
On February 3, 2004, then USSS Director Ralph Basham testified before the 
House subcommittee on crime, terrorism, and homeland security in regards to the USSS 
integration into DHS cyber operations and the agency’s cyber crime expansion. During 
his presentation, Basham testified that the agency’s investigations had developed from 
counterfeit currency and bank frauds to cyber-supported crimes due to the prevalence of 
technology within the financial sector. Basham also claimed that the ECTF model had 
“revolutionized” the government’s cyber response capabilities and that the USSS had 
expanded the ECTFs into 12 domestic locations.320 Basham also identified that the USSS 
317 The Invisible Battleground: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Science, and 
Research and Development of the House Select Committee on Homeland Security, 108th Cong., 1 (2003) 
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cyber methodology, drawing on the agency’s physical protection mission, focused on 
leveraging technology and the information uncovered during investigations to prevent 
additional attacks against the nation’s critical infrastructures.321 
In August 2004, the USSS National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC), in 
concert with the Carnegie Mellon University Cert Coordinating Center (CERT-CC), 
issued a study entitled “Insider Threat Study: Illicit Cyber Activity in the Banking and 
Finance Sector.” In utilizing NTAC, which specializes in developing behavioral-based 
guidelines for the USSS protective mission, in the criminal realm, the USSS was 
increasing its investment into cyber technologies and capabilities as well as indicating the 
increasing importance cyber security represented to the agency. The study, considered to 
be the first of its kind, indicated that behavioral approaches and security techniques could 
be effective in lessening an entity’s exposure to threats from the cyber world.322 The 
findings included 1.) Most intrusions required little technical sophistication; 2.) Most 
intrusions were financially motivated; and 3.) Incidents were often uncovered by different 
entities but were rarely discovered by the victim.323 The Insider Threat Study was highly 
regarded and provided the basis for many cyber security programs in the following years. 
Additionally, CERT-CC and NTAC have re-evaluated the findings on a bi-annual basis 
and re-issued new findings to assist industry in cyber security best practices.   
Further proof of the USSS’ cyber investigative expansion and concentration was 
evident when, on July 9, 2009, the USSS issued a joint press with the Italian National 
Police and the Postal Police announcing the creation of the first international ECTF in 
Rome, Italy, which was followed by the initiation of an ECTF based in London, 
England.324  
321 Ibid. 
322 Marisa R. Randazzo et al., Insider Threat Study: Illicit Cyber Activity in the Banking and Finance 
Sector (Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Melon Software Engineering Institute, 2005), 12. 
323 Ibid., 8, 13, 17. 
324 “United States Secret Service Signs Partnership Agreement with Italian Officials Establishing the 
First European Electronic Crimes Task Force,” U.S. Secret Service, July 6, 2009, 
http://www.secretservice.gov/press/GPA05-09_EuropeanECTF.pdf. 
 75 
                                                 
On April 12, 2011, USSS Deputy Special Agent in Charge (DSAIC) Pablo 
Martinez testified before the Senate subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism regarding 
how the USSS cyber investigative function was integral to the DHS mission to secure the 
nation’s cyber-supported CIKR. As proof of the importance that the USSS cyber mission 
represented to the department, Martinez referenced DHS’s recent publishing of the 2010 
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR), which established a unified strategic 
framework for the cyber security goals of the department as well as the QHSR’s 
description of the affect cyber criminals could have on the CIKR.325 Martinez also 
referenced the recognition within the government of the USSS’s cyber capabilities had 
resulted in the USSS being requested for input into the President’s Comprehensive 
National Cyber Security Initiative.326 Evidence of the agency’s substantial investment 
towards its cyber security mission was provided by Martinez’s description of the 
agency’s recent establishment of the National Computer Forensics Institute  (NCFI) 
located in Hoover, Alabama. The NCFI was the nation’s first cyber training facility 
dedicated to developing cyber investigative capabilities for the state and local law 
enforcement.327 Finally, Martinez highlighted a recent USSS cyber investigation which 
had enabled the agency to identify, and protect, over 100 corporations targeted by a 
cybercrime syndicate.328  
As referenced in this section, the Secret Service is one of the nation’s oldest law 
enforcement agencies and has served as the primary defender of the nation’s financial 
sector since its inception to suppress the rampant counterfeiting of U.S. currency. 
Although the agency is most widely known for its mission of protecting the U.S. 
President and others, the agency has consistently developed its investigative techniques to 
account for technology developments as they relate to the financial sector. With the 
agency’s transfer to DHS, and the inclusion of the agency into the department’s mission 
325 Cybersecurity and Data Protection in the Financial Sector: Hearing Before the Senate Committee 
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 112 Cong., 1 (2011) (statement of United States Secret Service 





                                                 
of securing the nation’s CIKR from varied cyber threats, the agency distinguished itself 
as a leader in cyber security through proactive law enforcement actions and is positioned 
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V. ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT 
STRATEGIES 
Chapter IV recorded the evolution of the DHS cyber security mission and the 
department’s gravitation to technology supported cyber defense and information sharing 
initiatives.   There has been an organizational hesitation to utilizing DHS law 
enforcement agencies authorities as an integral part of the department’s cyber security 
efforts. In addition, the development of the cyber security missions and focus of the NSA 
(inclusive of DOD/Cyber Command), FBI, and USSS, the four entities that possess the 
most comprehensive authorities within the cyber security and enforcement arena, were 
discussed. 
Chapter V leverages the information in the earlier chapters to analyze the 
implications of the differing approaches to achieving comprehensive cyber security, and 
recommend effective policy proposals for future government cyber security efforts. 
Microsoft’s Butler Lampson, in his 2004 article, “Computer security in the real world” 
describes cyber security programs as being focused on five primary cyber security 
strategies which seek to “isolate,” “exclude,” “restrict,” “recover,” or “punish” the 
attackers.329 The analysis of the implications of the DHS, NSA/DOD, FBI and USSS 
cyber focus will be reviewed using these principles applied to defensive technology and 
offensive operations.   
A. DHS NETWORK DEFENSIVE RELIANCE IMPLICATIONS  
As evidenced in the preceding chapters, since the time of its inception, DHS has 
continuously developed from what was initially a terror prevention and natural disaster 
response agency, towards focusing on critical infrastructure protection, and currently, to 
its focus on cyber security and the protection of cyber–supported critical infrastructures. 
Throughout its short history, the department developed a reliance on technology-based 
solutions, outreach efforts, and internal operational units while displaying little regard for 
the authorities and capabilities of legacy component DHS agencies. Chapter III, the 
329 Lampson, “Computer Security in the Real World,” 3. 
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Literature Review, presented academic information regarding the applicability and 
effectiveness of technology-centric cyber security preparations, but the department has 
increasingly been asked by Congress and the private sector to define the success of the 
overall DHS approach to cyber security and whether it offers a path forward for the 
government’s overarching cyber stance.   
As mandated by the Homeland Security Act, DHS is authorized to lead the effort 
to secure and increase the resilience of the nation’s critical infrastructures from attack and 
natural disasters.330 As described earlier in this thesis, the majority of the nation’s 
identified critical infrastructure is privately owned and/or outside of the immediate 
control of DHS. Although the Department has attained a level of success regarding 
disaster recovery and resilience through the utilization of its component agencies, namely 
FEMA and the Coast Guard, it has been widely criticized for failing in its cyber security 
mission.331 Interestingly, the department’s disaster response and recovery success 
through the efforts of its legacy agencies appears to not be recognized by the department 
leadership as a model to emulate within its cyber security mission. As developed in this 
thesis, to this point the Department’s cyber security efforts have focused on technology 
(intrusion detection and prevention system) development and reliance, information 
sharing with private sector infrastructure owners, and massive budget expenditures to 
develop new agencies or entities who’s mission would be duplicative of pre-existing 
DHS component agencies while simultaneously blaming failures on the department’s 
lack of authorities to control other government agency’s actions.332 As critical 
infrastructure becomes increasingly reliant on cyber technologies, the implications of 
DHS’s policy decisions will affect the nation’s future prosperity and success as the 
world’s economies and populations become increasingly interconnected and 
330 Sharon S. Gressle, Homeland Security Act of 2002: Legislative History and Pagination Key 
(Washington, DC:  Congressional Research Service, 2002), http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/
metacrs7490/m1/1/high_res_d/RL31645_2002Nov26.pdf. 
331    U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Critical Infrastructure Protection Department 
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Congressional Requesters, (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, May 2005).  
332 John Curran, “DHS OIG Chides Cyber Office Over Planning Deficiencies,” Cybersecurity Policy 
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 80 
                                                 
interdependent. For these reasons alone, the shortcomings of the department’s cyber 
security programs, and the impact, must be fully understood to effectively propose 
policies going forward.   
As evidenced by available literature and the department’s own publications, the 
development of cyber defensive technologies represents the lynchpin of the department’s 
cyber security efforts for securing both governmental and private sector owned critical 
infrastructure. In contrast, Chapter III, the literature review, provided academic studies of 
the effectiveness of technology defenses that indicated that solely relying on technology 
might be a misguided allocation of resources for a variety of reasons. Most notably, a 
defender can never be assured of identifying every weakness in his defenses and must 
remain in a response and recovery mode whereas the attacker has unlimited time to 
carefully reconnoiter and possibly reconfigure a system to identify and exploit defensive 
deficiencies. Additionally, the attacker must only find one weakness while the defender 
must identify all system weaknesses, an unfair advantage to the attacker to be sure. In 
effect, the adage that an attacker who spends their time building a taller ladder can always 
defeat the highest defensive wall, perfectly describes the false sense of security that 
reliance on technology to provide comprehensive security for our nation’s cyber-
supported critical infrastructures provides.  
Many recent reports support the claim that the development of defensive tools has 
never been able to keep pace with the attacker’s development of attack tools and that 
cyber security efforts centralized on defense have steadily fallen further behind the 
attacker’s efforts.333 Cyber security experts generally agree that comprehensive security 
that develops defensive technology, in combination with people, processes that identify 
and deter the attacker, and effective information sharing partnerships, is the only method 
of realizing success in the protection of our nation’s cyber supported critical 
333 PwC, 2014 U.S. State of CyberCrime Survey (London: PriceWaterhouseCoopers, June 2014), 
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/increasing-it-effectiveness/publications/2014-us-state-of-cybercrime.jhtml. 
 81 
                                                 
infrastructures.334 In furthering the “ladder” premise, without the ability to keep the 
attacker from climbing the ladder through active disruption of their efforts or deterring 
their attempt in the first place, the attacker will, inevitably, breach the defensive wall.  
As related in the literature review, the premise that the entire knowledge base of 
the government’s cyber programs, including NSA/DOD cyber attack forces and their 
tools and tactics, would also be leveraged by DHS for defense is also a misguided theory 
since numerous academic articles demonstrate that the government’s cyber attack forces 
have little to gain from identifying and supplying DHS with system weaknesses that they 
exploit when conducting their primary attack or espionage missions.335 The competing 
mission sets would ensure that DHS systems defenders would be operating without the 
benefit of knowing the most effective attack tools and how to effectively defend against 
them.   
For additional consideration, the cyber espionage activities of the NSA/DOD are 
designed to be undetectable by the targeted system defenders. Since NSA operations are 
conducted in secret, it is obvious that cyber attackers seeking to exploit our systems 
would not feel any overt deterrent effect from NSA’s operation. Shifting into the DOD 
cyber activities, consideration must be given that any overt use of our military to counter-
attack a foreign-based attacker may be deemed as an act of war or aggression by the host 
nation and lead to an escalating series of attack and counter-attacks targeting our 
infrastructures. These types of activity could be disastrous to our infrastructure and cause 
the destruction of basic service capabilities such as power, telecommunications and water 
supply.  
Despite their undeniable counter-attack and proven effectiveness in conducting 
foreign directed espionage, the above issues indicate that the NSA/DOD cyber attack 
forces are not the entity that DHS should rely on to keep attackers from climbing over 
their defensive “wall.” Developing a solely defensive posture relies on Lampson’s 
334 “Cybercrime Incidents, Associated Financial Costs Surge While Organizations Still Unprepared to 
Battle Threats According to 2014 U.S. State of Cybercrime Survey from PwC and CSO,” PwC, May 28, 
2014, http://www.pwc.com/us/en/press-releases/2014/cybercrime-incidents-associated-financial-costs-
surge.jhtml. 
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 82 
                                                 
strategy of “isolating” the system weakness, “excluding “ or “restricting” the attacker 
from the system, while continually preparing to “recover” from a successful attack. 
Unfortunately, Lampson’s “punishment” strategy to deter the attacker from attempting to 
climb the ladder is unattainable within DHS’s current defensive strategy or through 
surreptitious means. A deterrent factor can, however, be attained through using historical 
law enforcement authorities to determine culpability for illegal activities and 
subsequently prosecuting the attacker through internationally accepted judicial 
proceedings. As referenced earlier, Title 18 USC 1030 designates all cyber intrusions 
against protected systems as criminal acts in violation of U.S. federal law.336 William 
Goodman in his article “Cyber Deterrence: Tougher in Theory than in Practice,” 
identifies that deterrence has specific elements which include deterrent declarations, 
denial measures, penalty measures, credibility, fear and a cost/benefit analysis by the 
attacker.337 In effect, if a prospective attacker believes that their actions have a 
reasonable probability to result in arrest and a long period of incarceration, the attacker 
may not believe that the potential benefit is worth the cost of attacking. Recognizing, 
however, that some cyber attackers will not be deterred and will choose to commit an 
attack against a protected cyber system, every successful apprehension and incarceration 
will increase the possibility of deterring future attackers. If DHS recognizes the 
importance of the deterrent effect, successful law enforcement operations must become 
cornerstone of the department’s cyber security effort.  
Moving away from the deterrence discussion, DHS has actively promoted the 
development of trusted partnerships and information sharing initiatives with the private 
sector given the private sector’s ownership of the nation’s critical infrastructure. Of 
importance to this effort is if the department is able to develop the requisite level of trust 
with the private sector and foster a partnership with system owners. Because of the 
department’s reliance on defensive technology of questionable effectiveness that must be 
placed on, or within, privately owned systems, the department’s motives have been 
336 18 U.S.C. 1030 - Fraud and Related Activity in Connection with Computers. 
337 Will Goodman, “Cyber Deterrence: Tougher in Theory Than in Practice?” Strategic Studies 
Quarterly (2010): 4. 
 83 
                                                 
viewed skeptically by the system owners. Research indicates that the department has 
found it difficult to remain current with the dynamic nature of the cyber threat 
landscape.338 One of the most effective ways to develop the requisite level of trust and 
partnership with system owners is the effective sharing of actionable information 
between the government and private sector. Unfortunately, although some success has 
been achieved, many aspects of DHS’s information sharing efforts have been criticized 
and slow to develop due to governmental difficulties in sharing classified threat 
reporting.339  
In an effort to facilitate active information sharing, the department developed a 
network of “information sharing and analysis centers” (ISACs), with one of the first 
being the Financial Services-ISAC (FS-ISAC). The ISAC concept places critical 
infrastructure industry representatives at the department’s National Cyber security and 
Communication Integration Center (NCCIC) and provides instantaneous cyber threat 
intelligence sharing with the partners through their representatives.340 The NCCIC has 
been designated as the collection point for any cyber intelligence the department receives 
from the private sector, U.S. intelligence agencies, international CERT teams and law 
enforcement regarding current threats and attacks.341 As this information is received, it is 
transmitted throughout the world to other private industry contacts, law enforcement, and 
over 200 worldwide CERT teams to strengthen worldwide cyber defenses. The NCCIC 
and ISAC system is a positive step towards information sharing and has been widely 
praised as one of the department’s most effective efforts although it still periodically 
338 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Critical Infrastructure Protection Department of 
Homeland Security Faces Challenges in Fulfilling Cybersecurity Responsibilities: Report to Congressional 
Requesters (GAO-05-434) (Washington, DC: GAO, May 2005), 17. 
339 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Needs to 
Better Address Its Cybersecurity Responsibilities (GAO-08-1157T) (Washington, DC: GAO, Sept. 16, 
2008), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1157T 
340 Edwards, Review of the Department of Homeland Security’s Capability to Share Cyber Threat 
Information. 
341 Facilitating Cyber Threat Information Sharing and Partnering with the Private Sector to Protect 
Critical Infrastructure: An Assessment of DHS Capabilities: Hearing Before Subcommittee on 
Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies, 113th Cong., 1 (2013) (statement of 
NPPD Office of Cybersecurity and Communications Acting Assistant Secretary Roberta Stempfley and 
National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center Director Larry Zelvin). 
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encounters problems when attempting to share classified threat information with system 
owners.342 The inclusive manner that the NCCIC facilitates is obviously fostering an 
environment of partnership and represents a valuable path forward for the department and 
provides infrastructure owners with the ability to block many current threats and attacks.  
The information sharing efforts are in line with Lampson’s strategies of 
“isolating” and “restricting” the threat actor’s capabilities to successfully attack the 
nation’s cyber supported critical infrastructure while seeking the goal of making each 
private owner “accountable” for their system’s “integrity” and “availability.”  As long as 
the NCCIC remains central to the department’s information sharing efforts, the benefit 
the private sector realizes from being an active partner will ensure their ongoing 
interaction and cooperation. Failure to continually promote active information sharing 
between the government and private sector will allow the cyber security effort to revert 
back to individual system owners ineffectively attempting to defend their systems 
without awareness of the threat they are facing, the latest tools begin deployed against 
them, or the best practices discovered through attacks against other private system 
owners.   
As referenced earlier, DHS’s mandate to coordinate the government’s cyber 
security and response efforts has been resisted by other government agencies involved in 
related, but often competing, cyber missions. Repeated calls from within the DHS, the 
private sector and independent cyber security researchers, to provide the department with 
authorizing legislation and the ability to force compliance have thus far been 
unsuccessful.343 The government’s refusal to provide the department with some method 
of forcing the compliance of the other agencies has, at times, relegated the department to 
“asking” for other agencies to assist in cyber security efforts and hindered the overall 
government cyber security effort.   
Without considering the private sector ownership of the majority of the nation’s 
supporting critical infrastructure, the U.S. government controls many cyber-supported 
342 Wilshusen and Barkakati, Cybersecurity: National Strategy, Roles, and Responsibilities. 
343 Ibid., 4. 
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systems that fall outside of the control of DHS and which are vitally important to the 
nation’s prosperity including, the internal systems of the Department of the Treasury, 
Defense, Internal Revenue Service, and others. A successful cyber attack against one of 
those systems could cause cascading effects that would threaten the stability and integrity 
of the government systems and functions as well as the distrust of the system by our 
citizens. In recognition of the importance of the goal of securing our cyber-supported 
critical systems, the policy proposals later in this thesis will leverage DHS’s current 
activities along with other activities being conducted by governmental cyber attack, law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies. 
B. NSA/DOD CYBER SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE IMPLICATIONS 
As described in Chapter IV, the evolution of the NSA from an agency focused on 
the collection and exploitation of foreign adversary’s communications (COMINT) to 
focusing on the exploitation of signals intelligence (SIGINT), has positioned the agency 
at the forefront of the nation’s cyber security efforts resulting in the exponential growth 
of its structure and funding. The unique mission, structure, and capabilities of the agency, 
which operates as both a civilian intelligence (SIGINT) collection agency and a 
Department of Defense military organization (U.S. Cyber Command or CYBERCOM), 
provides the agency with opportunities to leverage the development of the Internet and 
cyberspace unmatched by any other U.S. government agency. The world’s increasing 
reliance on Internet communications and the interconnected cyber supported 
infrastructures allowed the NSA to develop its influence within the government and 
private cyber-supported critical infrastructure systems. But NSA’s development of cyber 
attack capabilities and domestic cyber security operations leaves the nation with a 
number of unresolved issues to include; whether the nation will allow the agency to have 
access to citizens’ personal information from the Internet and private corporate systems, 
which could appear to be a violation of our citizens’ right to privacy; and whether the 
nation should trust an intelligence agency to protect our civil liberties. Questions have 
also been raised regarding whether NSA domestic “information assurance” operations 
violate long held prohibitions restricting the use of the military and intelligence agencies 
within the homeland since NSA leadership is “dual hatted” as the Director of the NSA 
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and Commander of CYBERCOM. In light of these unresolved issues, various writers 
have indicated that the nation must decide if the domestic utilization of a 
military/intelligence agency is a violation of long-held American values?. 
The rise of the NSA as, arguably, the government’s primary cyber-security 
agency for the nation’s critical infrastructures, has been swift in light of the restrictions 
periodically placed on the agency by numerous legislative bodies following well-
documented abuses of its capabilities and lawful authorities.344 One factor that 
undoubtedly assisted in the development of the agency’s cyber-security focus and 
capabilities was the redefining of criminal or national security cyber activities to being 
indicators of the future “cyber war” or “cyber terror” campaign that the nation would 
undoubtedly face. Not surprisingly, given its significant SIGINT capabilities and rapidly 
developing cyber attack capabilities, NSA continues to market itself as the obvious, and 
only, choice in cyber security. According to NSA, the agency is perfectly positioned 
because it can serve as a deterrent or counter-attack force capable of successfully 
mitigating threatening attackers, in effect positioning itself to keep the attackers off the 
“ladder” and serving as a deterrence to future attacks. However, as described in the 
literature review, the agency’s claims of future acts “cyber terror” and “cyber war” has 
been refuted by numerous scholars as an over blown threat. Detractors argue that, by 
definition, “cyber terror” and “cyber war” are not valid descriptions of the activities of 
cyber attackers since the effects of the attack would cause the effect terrorists or attacking 
military forces seek or require.345 Scholars claim that the world has never experienced an 
act of cyber terrorism, and is unlikely to ever experience one because a cyber attack 
would not terrorize the population; instead the acts would merely disrupt modern 
conveniences. Additionally, due to the vastness of the Internet and the redundant systems 
common in our critical infrastructures, any cyber attack initiated by terrorists would not 
cause anything but minor disruptions in service that would be easily negated through 
technical means.   
344 O’Connell, “Cyber Security without Cyber War,” 1. 
345 Gabriel Weimann, “Cyberterrorism: How Real Is the Threat?” (Washington, DC: United States 
Institute of Peace, 2009), http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/handle/123456789/15033. 
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Regarding the possibility of future cyber-warfare, history has shown that the 
limited disruptive cyber attacks utilized during regional conflicts have not been 
successful in debilitating the targeted systems to support military action although they 
have disrupted citizen services.346 Dissenting opinions also point out that, while cyber 
activity may be utilized to support kinetic military action through the disruption of 
command and control structures and other cyber-supported systems in the future, any act 
committed solely in cyberspace does not qualify as an act of “cyber war” and offers 
military operations few tangible results.347 As described in the previous section however, 
utilizing our military forces to retaliate for a cyber attack directed against our 
infrastructure requires careful consideration because another nation may consider our 
response an act of war even if that is not our intention. 
The consistent warnings regarding future acts of cyber terrorism directed at our 
nation’s critical infrastructures, and acts of cyber-war perpetrated against our national 
interests, have been supported by the defining of the cyberspace as the newest “war 
fighting” domain. Not surprisingly, these claims have found its most vocal proponents 
within the nation’s military and intelligence apparatus.348 Proponents have continued 
their calls to develop cyber warfare capabilities despite the fact that all independent cyber 
security surveys and reports indicate that the overwhelming majority of malicious cyber 
activity is financially-motivated criminal activity with a much smaller segment being 
described as nation-state directed espionage activities.349 In response, 
NSA/CYBERCOM has been one of the most vocal proponents of designating cyberspace 
as a war-fighting domain in order to position itself as the only entity capable of 
commanding the space.350  
A review of the literature regarding capabilities and methods of the cyber threat 
indicates the nation must resist the efforts to militarize cyberspace. The rush to militarize 
346 O’Connell, “Cyber Security without Cyber War,” 5. 
347 Gartzke, “The Myth of Cyberwar,” 2. 
348 III, “Defending a New Domain,” 3. 
349 O’Connell, “Cyber Security without Cyber War,” 5. 
350 Libicki, “Cyberspace Is Not a Warfighting Domain,” 13. 
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cyberspace, with its requisite strict controls and oversight, could limit the original intent 
behind the development of the Internet as a communication platform to facilitate the open 
exchange of ideas and information. Additionally, if the nation is currently under constant 
attack through cyberspace and it should be considered the newest war-fighting domain, 
under what rules, if any, should the military operate?  As noted cyber expert Martin 
Libicki points out, under what rules, and through which actions, can the military “fire 
back”?351 Others ask, if cyberspace is a borderless domain, owned by no authority, 
whose national “use of force” laws apply?352 Underlying all of these questions is the 
importance of attribution for attacks. As referenced in Chapter III, societies have 
consistently utilized law enforcement authorities to maintain internal order and the 
military to maintain external order.353 Before the proper response to a cyber attack can be 
decided upon, the attack must be attributed to a specific actor, unfortunately, should the 
military respond without valid attribution, our response to what may have been mere 
criminal activity could be viewed as an act of war. 
Outside of the militarization of cyber space, NSA’s positioning as the 
government’s leading cyber security agency protecting our nation’s critical infrastructure 
also holds implications for our citizens’ constitutionally protected right to privacy which 
must be carefully considered for several reasons.   
First, the utilization of a “dual hatted” military and intelligence agency to conduct 
domestic cyber security operations may violate long-standing prohibitions against 
utilizing the military except in very limited circumstances.354 The prohibitions against 
military intervention in civilian affairs is based on our nation’s core principle that the 
military, which operates at the direction of the executive branch of the government, exists 
to defend the nation against foreign threats and should never be used by the government 
to control the citizenry. This important principle, enacted in 1878, is known as the Posse 
351 Ibid., 13. 
352 O’Connell, “Cyber Security without Cyber War,” 12. 
353 Brenner, “At Light Speed,” 5. 
354 Tomisek, Homeland Security: The New Role for Defense, 6. 
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Comitatus Act and is now codified in federal law as Title 18 USC 1385.355 To preserve 
our liberties, the responsibility of enforcing a legislated code of conduct for our citizens 
has been delegated to domestic law enforcement agencies, whose operations are 
consistently reviewed by the judicial branch of government. This consistent oversight and 
separation of responsibilities and powers ensures the protection of our citizens’ right to 
privacy from government interference. Expanding the rules for the domestic utilization of 
the military must be carefully reviewed to ensure there is no degradation of our citizens’ 
basic rights.   
Secondly, and of particular concern, is the slow blurring of the restrictions on IC 
operations, the clever use of the “dual hatted” positioning of the NSA leadership, and the 
co-location of NSA and DOD cyber forces. In a 2010 interview, then NSA Director and 
CYBERCOM Commander, General Keith Alexander, admitted that CYBERCOM does 
not have the legal authority or justification to operate domestically or to assist in the 
defense of privately owned cyber-supported infrastructure, adding that only the White 
House could legislate that activity.356 According to Alexander, CYBERCOM was only 
authorized to defend DOD networks or to wage offensive operations against foreign 
targets. However, in the same interview, the “dual hatted” Alexander described how 
NSA’s Information Assurance directorate was actively engaged in helping secure 
government and domestically located private networks from cyber intrusion.357 Given the 
co-location and close coordination of the CYBERCOM and NSA personnel and 
operations, is it prudent to trust that the information and access allowed to one entity will 
not be shared with their close allies in the office next door?  Additionally, as mandated in 
the Church Commission, U.S. intelligence agencies are prohibited from operating 
domestically. The only agency authorized to engage in domestic intelligence collection, 
355 Charles Doyle and Jennifer Elsea, The Posse Comitatus Act and Related Matters: A Sketch, (CRS 
Report No. R42659) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 21, 2012), 
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA462391. 
356 Shachtman, “Military’s Cyber Commander Swears: ‘No Role’ in Civilian Networks.”  
357 Ibid. 
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while ensuring that our citizens’ constitutional rights are protected through judicial 
reviews and oversight, is the FBI.358  
The nation must carefully consider the implications of allowing NSA/DOD to 
redefine their operational domain and mission focus. As described in the Chapter IV, 
throughout its history, despite consistently issuing policies and guidance proposing to 
protect civil liberties, the NSA, and the greater IC, has consistently exceeded its legal 
authorities and illegally collected the constitutionally protected communications from our 
citizens in the name of national security. The nation must recognize that the redefining of 
cyber space as a borderless domain is very appealing to the NSA specifically because it 
removes the long standing prohibitions that restricts the agency’s activities, and allows it 
to gather intelligence through the exploitation of cyberspace and the worldwide Internet 
communications of American citizens. Additionally, as widely reported, the worldwide 
distribution of networks through which those communications travel has provided the 
NSA with collection opportunities outside of the nation’s borders while still, arguably, 
operating in compliance with existing legislation and guidelines.359  
Finally, to augment the previously described DHS defensive cyber security 
stance, consideration must be given to the desired effect in utilizing NSA/DOD as the 
primary cyber security apparatus to protect our cyber supported critical infrastructure. 
Only the uninformed, certainly not this writer, would deny the capabilities of the NSA in 
the cyber intelligence collection and cyber exploitation arena however; the use of these 
capabilities must be carefully measured for their desired outcomes and targeting.   
To provide a deterrent effect that dissuades nation-state attacks against our critical 
infrastructure, CYBERCOM’s cyber network attack (CNA) capacity, as an externally 
focused cyber military force reminiscent of the Cold War nuclear deterrence strategy, has 
few peers. When NSA is utilized to conduct surreptitious, foreign cyber espionage 
activities, few would argue against that as improper use of the agency and its capabilities. 
However, as widely reported, since the majority of attacks targeting the nation’s 
358 “Final Report S. Rep No.94-755.” 
359 Daniel Byman and Benjamin Wittes, “Reforming the NSA,” Foreign Affairs, April 17, 2014, 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141215/daniel-byman-and-benjamin-wittes/reforming-the-nsa. 
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infrastructure are criminal in nature, neither of these capabilities represents the proper 
tool that deters the majority of future attacks.360 To return to the earlier “ladder” 
reference, only a visible response or force, whose activities support Lampson’s strategy 
of accountability and punishment, will result in deterring an attacker from launching an 
attack or building the ladder to scale the defensive wall.   The surreptitious nature of 
NSA’s important foreign espionage activities, by design and definition, can’t provide a 
deterrence factor and should not be the government’s choice to augment DHS’s defensive 
efforts however, the agency’s capabilities in cyber espionage targeting foreign interests, 
and its ongoing preparations to counter possible future foreign military cyber attacks, 
must be integrated into our nation’s cyber security efforts. The following two sections 
discuss the two agencies with the authorities and capabilities to attribute cyber attacks 
against our nation’s critical infrastructure to specific actors and to keep those attackers 
from climbing over the metaphorical defensive wall. 
C. FBI NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS IMPLICATIONS 
As described in Chapter IV, the FBI has developed to become the most 
recognized law enforcement agency in the U.S. The FBI is unique among U.S. law 
enforcement agencies due to its dual mission of criminal investigations and national 
security (intelligence collection) activities, which have allowed the agency the 
opportunity to redirect its assets and efforts to counter the most pressing enforcement 
issues of the day. However, as described earlier, these dual, sometimes competing, 
missions have caused the agency difficulties in the proper allocation of resources, agency 
infighting and overreach of authority. This section will analyze the FBI’s position as the 
preeminent, national-security focused, law enforcement agency and how its approach to 
responding to cyber attacks against the nation’s critical infrastructure is an important 
national capability whose use has implications that will affect our economic prosperity 
and the security of our national critical infrastructure far into the future.   
360 “2013 Data Breach Investigations Report,” Verizon Enterprise Solutions, accessed September 29, 
2013, http://www.verizonenterprise.com/DBIR/2013/. 
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The decade after the 9/11 attacks represents the most recent time period for the 
agency, as it refocused its resources and efforts from reactive, traditional criminal 
investigations to intelligence driven counter-terror or national security efforts and finally 
towards the understanding that the developing cyber world represented the future of 
operations and budgets. The changing nature of the FBI’s mission and how the agency 
viewed its future was captured in FBI Director James Comey’s previously described 
November 2013 testimony to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs. During that testimony, Director Comey identified intelligence-
driven counter terrorism as the agency’s primary mission but announced that the agency 
was beginning the process of re-allocating its personnel and budget resources to 
countering cyber threats to the national infrastructure as that became the most pervasive 
threat to the country’s prosperity.361 As an indicator of this shift, Director Comey 
identified the FBI’s partnership with DHS and the NSA to co-chair the Enduring Security 
Framework (ESF), a committee which brings together the top leaders of private industry 
and the government to identify cyber threat issues and work together to counter those 
threats through the utilization of counter intelligence methods and information.362 But is 
the application of, or reliance on, national security investigations the most effective 
method of describing and mitigating the threat or merely an effective method that should 
be carefully applied when mitigating specific cyber attacks?   
Supporting Director Comey’s testimony, during the May 2013 testimony of FBI 
Assistant Director (AD) for Counter Intelligence, Randall Coleman, to the Senate 
Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism, FBI leadership clearly indicated that 
the agency views financially motivated cyber crimes and cyber attacks against any of the 
nation’s 16 critical infrastructures as a national security issue regardless of the motivation 
or sponsorship of the attacker. AD Coleman specifically outlined the FBI’s intention to 
allocate the Bureau’s counter-intelligence resources to investigate “economic espionage” 
361    Threats to the Homeland: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs Federal Bureau of Investigation, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of James B. Comey, 




                                                 
and the theft of trade secrets from private corporations as a national security issue.363 
Coleman further explained that the FBI had commenced investigating corporate 
espionage cases in conjunction with the DOJ National Security Division’s (NSD) 
Counter Espionage section.364 The re-defining of the criminal activity previously 
identified as corporate espionage should be given closer consideration for the far-
reaching effects it may have for a few reasons. 
First, few would argue that the theft of corporate trade secrets from select critical 
infrastructure owners, namely the defense/industrial contractors or government agencies, 
by nation-state supported cyber attackers does not constitute a national security issue. 
Clearly, the theft of that information by foreign agents could negatively impact the 
government’s ability to maintain our military superiority, national defense, or our 
government’s international negotiating efforts. However, the theft of a corporation’s 
private manufacturing processes or intellectual property, which represents a monetary 
interest or benefit primarily to the private corporation’s investors and executive staff can 
hardly be considered a national security interest. If the blurring of the definition of nation 
security interest continues, and the well-being of every corporation becomes a national 
security issue, whose responsibility will the security of their systems be?  Careful 
consideration of this application of the “national security” designation must be made as to 
whether it indemnifies the private sector for their cyber security stance or provides the 
intelligence community or military with an avenue to attempt to expand their operations 
domestically.   
To assist in properly defining the threat and the cyber attacker’s intent, 
Georgetown University’s Forrest Hare, in his presentation to the 2012 International 
Conference on Cyber Conflict, offered the following definitions describing national 
security cyber attack boundaries. Hare identified that national security cyber attacks 
could be committed by either nation-state supported or organized non-state actors, but 
363 Combating Economic Espionage and Trade Secret Theft: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary 
Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism, 113th Cong., 2 (2014) (statement of Randall Coleman, assistant 




                                                 
that they must; 1) seek to gain knowledge from information systems which contain 
knowledge of national security value or; 2.) Attack critical infrastructure systems to 
degrade or disrupt such systems to cause a national crisis.365 I propose that the 
government should not desire, nor will it benefit from, the responsibility for ensuring the 
security of corporate networks for cyber threats that fall outside of these parameters. The 
true beneficiaries of the expansion of the definition of a national security attack could 
only be the agencies whose budgets are increasingly funded to counter the threat, namely 
the FBI, NSA or, in specific circumstances, the DOD.   
The second reason that the redefining of cyber criminal activity should be 
carefully reviewed prior to incorporation into our national strategy is that the methods of 
successfully mitigating these criminal acts already exist. Few currently in government 
recognize that the theft of intellectual property is a legacy U.S. Customs enforced 
criminal violation whose investigation authority has been transferred to DHS’s 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Homeland Security Investigations Agency (ICE-
HSI). In the increasingly constricted budgetary environment, the duplication of 
enforcement efforts and activities is inefficient and duplicative. Additionally, the FBI 
currently devotes a majority of its cyber-trained workforce to the Cyber Criminal 
Division, which conducts criminal investigations of cyber intrusions against protected 
systems in violation of Title 18 USC 1030. As documented earlier in this thesis, the FBI 
shares concurrent jurisdiction with the U.S. Secret Service for violations of 18 USC 1030 
and, like the USSS, has successfully investigated numerous criminally motivated cyber 
attackers located domestically and abroad. Like the USSS, the FBI Cyber Division 
conducts criminal investigations to collect evidence for use in criminal prosecutions in 
compliance with existing criminal evidentiary laws and is subject to judicial and defense 
counsel review. In the rush to re-classify cyber criminal acts as national security events, 
the tactics and capabilities of the FBI criminal investigations may become over shadowed 
365 F. Hare, “The Significance of Attribution to Cyberspace Coercion: A Political Perspective,” in 
Proceedings of 2012 4th International Conference on Cyber Conflict, eds. Christian Czosseck, Rain Ottis, 
and Katharina Ziolkowski (New York: IEEE, 2012), http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/
abs_all.jsp?arnumber=6243970. 
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by national security investigations, many of which develop into long term monitoring 
operations versus operations which seek to identify and punish the attackers. 
Over the course of its history, the FBI developed a well-deserved reputation for 
aggressively investigating espionage in the physical world, especially during the Soviet 
Cold War era. The agency is very effective at monitoring suspected foreign intelligence 
agents and conducting nation security investigations with a goal of criminally charging 
individuals involved in espionage and the theft of information vital to the nation’s 
security. During that time period, the Bureau utilized classified techniques, including 
electronic interception, surreptitious entries, and other activities to identify the foreign 
espionage actors, develop evidence, and criminally charge the perpetrators. Historically, 
few of these cases resulted in open court proceedings; instead, many operations resulted 
in expulsions of foreign agents involved in espionage. As related earlier, many cyber 
security experts stress the importance of developing a deterrent effect to dissuade 
attackers from attacking the nation’s cyber-supported critical infrastructures. Hare 
identifies that nation state attackers, when targeting a potential victim that has an active 
defense, response and cyber investigative capability, may be easier to dissuade from 
conducting attacks than a financially-motivated criminal, patriot hacker or terrorist due to 
their motivations and the need to remain secretive.366 Recently, the FBI has initiated the 
process of criminally charging, and publically identifying nation-state attackers seeking 
to steal national security information.367 Although, given the remote possibility that the 
attackers will ever be tried and the typical deterrent effect may be limited, the public 
response from the Chinese government indicates that publically attributing attacks to 
nation state actors may offer some measurable effect.368  
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As discussed in the preceding section, following abuses of our citizens’ 
constitutional rights by the IC during domestic intelligence operations, legislation was 
passed which solely authorized the FBI to conduct domestic intelligence collection with 
appropriate judicial oversight.369 The drive to expand the designation of all cyber attacks 
against the nation’s critical infrastructure as a national security issue and expand the 
definition of espionage or national security interests may quickly overwhelm the agency 
and result in missed opportunities to mitigate true national security cyber attacks. More 
importantly, the designation of all cyber attacks against the nation’s critical infrastructure 
as a national security event may also enable other government agencies, namely the 
NSA/DOD to argue for an increased role in domestic operations, an activity which has 
resulted in abuses of our citizens’ rights and is in violation of existing legal guidance.  
Finally, reports regarding the government’s cyber security efforts have 
consistently indicated the importance of sharing cyber threat information regarding the 
tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) of attackers with the owners of the critical 
infrastructure cyber systems to aid in their defensive efforts.370 Equally consistently, the 
government’s information sharing efforts have been criticized as ineffective or 
incomplete because government intelligence agencies have classified the TTPs as 
“secret” (S) or “top secret” (TS) and the system owners are not authorized, nor capable, 
of receiving classified information.371 The current effort by the intelligence community 
to classify all attacks against the critical infrastructure as a national security event will, by 
design, further exacerbate this issue and ensure the necessary information will never be 
provided to system owners.372 In contrast, the sharing of cyber criminal TTPs does not 
require S or TS classified access, is regularly shared with system owner/operators to aid 
369“Final Report S. Rep No.94-755.” 
370 GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Department of Homeland Security Faces Challenges in 
Fulfilling Cybersecurity Responsibilities. 
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in their defenses, and has been recognized as a highly effective information sharing 
effort.373  
Given the FBI’s capabilities and authorities in conducting both criminal and 
national security cyber investigations, the agency should be integral to the nation’s cyber 
security efforts. The agency’s capabilities to conduct successful criminal investigations 
and prosecutions will compound the deterrent effects of other agency’s efforts and 
supports defensive efforts to keep cyber attackers from climbing the “ladder” over DHS 
and private sector technical defenses. In addition, the agency’s sole authorities to conduct 
domestic national security investigations allows the agency to utilize information 
received from the IC and its own intelligence investigations to attribute and publically 
charge nation-state supported attackers while still protecting our citizens’ constitutional 
rights. The current attempts to re-designate all cyber attacks as national security events 
and the definition of the cyber world as a “borderless” domain can reasonably be 
expected to eventually impact the effectiveness of law enforcement operations, the 
privacy of our citizens’ rights, and the effectiveness of the FBI’s domestic counter-
intelligence efforts as the IC chooses to instead conduct their own domestic operations. 
The efforts of the FBI, which has recently recognized the importance of disrupting 
national security attacks through investigations, versus of the historical IC method of 
passive monitoring, must remain a major part of the government’s cyber security effort 
while still leveraging other agencies and their capabilities.374 
D. U.S. SECRET SERVICE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION IMPLICATIONS 
As documented in Chapter IV, the Secret Service is one of the nation’s oldest law 
enforcement agencies and has served as the primary defender of the nation’s financial 
sector since its inception to suppress the rampant counterfeiting of U.S. currency. 
Although the agency is most widely known for its mission of protecting the U.S. 
373 Hacked Off: Helping Law Enforcement Protect Private Financial Information: Hearing Before the 
House Committee on Financial Services, 112th Cong., 1 (2011), (statement of Alvin T. Smith, Assistant 
Director, Office of Investigations, United States Secret Service), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2011/06/29/
testimony-assistant-director-smith-office-investigations-us-secret-service-house. 
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President and others, the agency has consistently developed its investigative techniques to 
account for technology developments as they relate to the financial sector. Following the 
agency’s transfer to DHS, and the inclusion of the agency into the department’s mission 
of securing the nation’s CIKR from cyber threats, the USSS has distinguished itself as a 
leader in cyber-crime law enforcement through strategic and proactive law enforcement 
investigations targeting the most prolific, financially-motivated criminal cyber attackers 
in the world. Through these investigations, and an investment in its personnel, the agency 
had developed a highly trained workforce which is adept at leveraging its very broad 
cyber security authorities and is capable of providing DHS with an offensive capability 
that provides a deterrent effect to support the department’s defensive efforts. This section 
will analyze the efforts and successes of the USSS cyber investigative activities and the 
implications of those activities being integrated by the department to support the DHS 
cyber security mission. It is noted that the previously discussed attributes of the FBI 
cyber crime investigations and their effect on the overall cyber security stance of the 
government applies to the USSS investigations however, USSS criminal investigations 
offer DHS addition benefits because the USSS is a component DHS agency. 
As earlier described, the USSS shares concurrent jurisdiction with the FBI to 
investigate violations of Title 18 USC 1030 regarding cyber intrusions into protected 
systems.375 Although the USSS has historically concentrated its investigative efforts to 
investigate intrusions targeting the nation’s financial payment systems, the USA Patriot 
Act authorized the agency to conduct criminal investigations involving cyber intrusions 
supporting terrorism and to expand its network of ECTFs.376 As the only DHS law 
enforcement agency with jurisdiction to investigate cyber intrusions, utilizing the USSS 
authorities and capabilities would provide DHS with an “in-house” offensive capability 
to deny attackers from using the euphemistic “ladder” to climb over the department’s 
defensive walls. Supporting Lampson’s description of comprehensive cyber security, 
USSS law enforcement operations provide DHS with the capacity to successfully 
“attribute” the cyber attacks to specific actors as well as to “isolate” and “punish” the 
375 Doyle, Cybercrime: An Overview of the Federal Computer Fraud. 
376 USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
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attacker.377 The well-documented deterrent effect recognized from arresting and 
incarcerating attackers can only serve to augment and support the defensive technology 
currently utilized by the department. 
An additional effect of DHS effectively utilizing the USSS cyber investigative 
capability involves the ability for the department to utilize the USSS as its primary cyber 
response component when a cyber attack against the critical infrastructure is detected. As 
demonstrated earlier in this thesis and through DHS documents such as 2010’s 
“Preventing and Defending against Cyber Attacks,” the department has preferred to 
concentrate on defensive technology and publicized its reliance on its own cyber response 
capability in the form of the U.S.-CERT and ICS-CERT teams, while omitting the cyber 
response capability of the USSS.378 Unfortunately, the CERT teams, while highly trained 
and technically capable, are predominantly located at DHS headquarters in Washington, 
DC, and lack the capacity to respond to the victim in the immediate aftermath of an 
attack and render aid if the victim requests on-site support, mitigation and DHS 
representation. Additionally, the CERT teams, and all other DHS response teams, lack 
the legal authorities of the USSS to respond to the victim location, initiate an 
investigation, mitigate the attack, and identify and apprehend the attacker.379 Often, in 
the past, the department has been relegated to asking the FBI to respond to the victim and 
share whatever information the FBI discovers during its investigation. The USSS 
currently operates 45 field offices and 35 Electronic Crimes Task Forces (ECTF) that are 
located within two hours of all of the national critical infrastructures.380 The distribution 
of USSS trained cyber-criminal investigators throughout the country offers the 
department the opportunity to provide a departmental cyber incident response capability 
that is unattainable through other internal DHS means. 
377 Lampson, “Computer Security in the Real World,” 4. 
378 “Preventing and Defending against Cyber Attacks.” 
379 DHS and OIG, U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team Makes Progress, 9. 
380 “About the U.S. Secret Service Electronic Crimes Task Forces,” United States Secret Service, 
accessed June 8, 2014, http://www.secretservice.gov/ectf_about.shtml. 
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As described in the section detailing DHS’ cyber security defensive efforts, one of 
the most successful operations of the department entails its ability to share cyber threat 
information with system owners to assist in securing their systems. Although not fully 
successful, the department’s NCCIC has developed aggressively and is becoming widely 
recognized for providing actionable cyber threat information. Currently lacking its own 
primary collection capabilities, the NCCIC receives threat information from a network of 
international CERT teams, system owners and the IC community as it becomes available 
or is shared by the originators. Law enforcement techniques utilized by the USSS during 
its investigations, including long-term undercover operations, confidential informants, 
court ordered (Title III) communication intercepts and evidence collected through search 
warrants and subpoenas, offer the department an avenue of cyber-threat intelligence 
collection that has been relatively underutilized thus far. The leveraging of USSS derived 
evidentiary information may offer the department the opportunity to develop its 
reputation as the originator of cyber threat information and not be reliant on other 
agencies whose competing interests may impact the sharing effort.   
Additionally, the evidence collected during active USSS investigations is often an 
optimal source of current cyber threat TTPs since it is derived directly from real-time law 
enforcement operations and current intrusions while still protecting the victim’s identity. 
As related in the April 2014 Senate testimony of USSS Deputy Special Agent in Charge 
(DSAIC) William Noonan, proactive law enforcement operations often provide the USSS 
with information regarding ongoing, or planned, network intrusions not identified by any 
other method or source, including discovery by the victim.381 DSAIC Noonan testified 
that, recognizing the importance of preventing or quickly mitigating an attack, the USSS 
supports utilizing the NCCIC to quickly share the information to critical system owners 
and worldwide cyber security teams.382  
381 Data Breach on the Rise: Protecting Personal Information from Harm: Hearing Before the Senate 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong, 2 (2014) (statement of USSS 




                                                 
The final implication of DHS utilizing information and access derived during 
USSS criminal investigations is that the department can openly report to system owners 
that their private corporate information, personnel identifying information, or other 
sensitive information will not be exposed to members of the IC or other private 
corporations through USSS investigations of NCCIC information sharing efforts. Both 
the USSS and the NCCIC have worked diligently to foster trusted partnerships with the 
private sector that stress discretion and privacy protection.383 Following the revelations 
by former NSA employee Edward Snowden, regarding the NSA’s widespread electronic 
surveillance of citizens’ private communications and intrusions into private corporate 
networks, many system owners have become hesitant to allow government access into 
their private networks.384 This hesitance by system owners may provide an opportunity 
to solidify the USSS and NCCIC as the government’s primary cyber response and 
information sharing cyber security effort.  
The Secret Service has developed a recognized expertise in conducting cyber 
crime investigations that represents a capability unavailable to the department through 
any other DHS component agency. The agency’s legal authorities, cyber response and 
investigation, attack mitigation, criminal intelligence collection and deterrence 
capabilities can successfully fulfill missing cyber security capability gaps for DHS as it 
seeks to protect our nation’s cyber-supported critical infrastructures. In the following 
section, recommended effective policy proposals for future government comprehensive 
cyber security efforts that leverage agency specific capabilities and authorities will be 
proposed. 
383 Protecting Consumer Information: Can Data Breaches Be Prevented?: Hearing Before the House 
Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing and Trade, 113th Cong., 2 (2014) (statement of USSS 
Criminal Investigative Division Deputy Special Agent in Charge William Noonan), 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=750769. 
384 Byman and Wittes, “Reforming the NSA.” 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS, POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
FUTURE EFFORTS 
The thesis reviewed available literature and evidence to offer answers to the stated 
research questions and provide a basis for effective policy recommendations.   
• Primary research question:  What strategies can the U.S. government 
develop that support the efforts of DHS, in concert with other 
governmental cyber security entities, to ensure the nation’s cyber-
supported critical infrastructure is provided with the most comprehensive 
security, while ensuring our citizens’ privacy and security are preserved? 
• Secondary research question: How could the application of established 
law enforcement investigative authorities and capabilities augment the 
technology-centric, defensive cyber methods currently utilized by the 
Department of Homeland Security to secure the nation’s critical 
infrastructure against criminal cyber intrusions? 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The thesis examined the U.S. government’s post-9/11 initial focus on the threat 
posed by international terrorism to its shifting focus on the nation’s resiliency to “all 
hazards” threats. The nation’s subsequent recognition that the rapidly developing cyber 
world supports all of the nation’s critical infrastructures and exposes vulnerabilities that 
could result in cascading effects and catastrophic results if exploited was then reviewed 
in this effort. As the department whose mandated primary mission is to ensure the 
security and resiliency of our nation’s critical infrastructure, this thesis specifically 
examined the Department of Homeland Security as it followed the identical development 
process as the overall U.S. government in the post-9/11 era. 
In the decade since 9/11, DHS was mandated to ensure the security of the nation’s 
cyber-supported critical infrastructure that is predominantly privately owned.   Chapter 4, 
Section A, presented evidence which suggests that DHS has consistently chosen to 
devote disproportionate budgetary resources to develop defensive technologies of 
questionable effectiveness, initiate redundant information sharing programs, and to 
develop cyber incidence response teams while not considering the utilization of 
component agency’s legal authorities and capabilities, namely the U.S. Secret Service. To 
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provide recommendations to assist the department in developing a comprehensive cyber 
security methodology, an in depth analysis of the cyber-security mission and authorities 
of DHS was compared with the specific cyber authorities and capabilities of the USSS. 
The analysis indicated that the USSS has the expertise and legal mandate to integrate the 
traditional model of criminal investigation and deterrence to the realm of cyber security 
and support the DHS mission.385  
Cyber-law enforcement effectiveness was also contrasted against the suitability 
and effectiveness of the militarization of cyberspace and the applicability of utilizing 
intelligence or military agencies to fulfill the nation’s domestic cyber-security mission. 
Evidence presented indicates that DHS’s apparent acceptance of the premise that 
NSA/DOD should provide technical assistance, cyber security support, mitigation, and 
cyber threat indicators, may be in violation of existing laws prohibiting the domestic 
operation of the intelligence community and military. Evidence identified within the 
literature review and elsewhere in this thesis also indicates that relying on the IC and 
military cyber attack forces to provide effective defensive indicators and information may 
be an false assumption because providing that information would be counter to the IC and 
military’s primary mission and negatively affect their overall effectiveness. The analysis 
indicated that the government’s proposed designation of all cyber attacks targeting the 
nation’s critical infrastructure as a “national security” event was initiated and fully 
supported by the IC and military. This designation, regardless of the identity or 
motivations of the perpetrator, was described within this thesis as a thinly veiled attempt 
to provide justification for the entire IC to operate domestically despite the fact that the 
FBI is the only IC agency legally authorized to conduct domestic operations to counter 
national security threats. Finally, this proposal by the IC was presented as an effort that 
could threaten our citizens’ privacy due to the lack of intelligence community operational 
oversight and the borderless nature of the cyber world.   
Below, the thesis offers recommendations to support the formulation of 
government cyber-security policy that could develop the most effective, integrated cyber-
385 “DHS Cyber Component Overview,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, accessed January 
19, 2014, www.dhs.gov. 
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security methods while continuing to effectively investigate and punish cyber attackers, 
deter future attacks, protect civil liberties, and the functionality of the Internet.  
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. DOD/NSA must remain focused on nation-state cyber threats and foreign 
activities.   
To ensure that the NSA, the nation’s premier SIGINT collection agency, remains 
focused on the exploitation of foreign SIGINT and foreign espionage activities in support 
of our national security interests, as well as to protect our citizens’ civil liberties, the 
agency must not be permitted to utilize its capabilities on domestic targets or systems. 
Additionally, the DOD cyber attack forces must not operate on or within domestic cyber 
systems, unless owned by the DOD, and must concentrate their activities to exploiting 
foreign vulnerabilities.  
2. FBI must remain the only IC agency permitted to operate domestically 
with proper judicial oversight.  
The Bureau’s domestic cyber intelligence activity must be limited to the 
investigation of espionage threats which are committed by nation-state supported actors 
that 1.) Seek to gain knowledge from information systems which contain information of 
national security value or; 2.) Attack critical infrastructure systems to degrade or disrupt 
such systems to cause a national crisis. The FBI Cyber Criminal Division should continue 
to investigate cyber intrusions within their criminal jurisdictions.  
3. DHS should continue to enhance its network defense capabilities and 
information sharing initiatives but must increase its utilization and 
reliance on the deterrent effect of USSS cyber criminal investigations as 
an integral part of the department’s cyber security efforts.   
Although, as indicated within this thesis, defensive technology can never be 
expected to thwart the most determined or advanced attackers, defensive technology does 
provide a high level of protection. As presented within the thesis, in recognition of the 
inherent vulnerabilities in cyber systems, deterrent law enforcement operations are 
necessary to ensure attackers are identified and apprehended. 
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C. FUTURE RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS 
While this thesis provided a comprehensive review of a portion of the total cyber 
security issues confronting this nation and our current cyber security efforts, we must 
recognize that the cyber world is continuing to rapidly develop and expand its influence 
on our everyday lives. Additionally, as a nation, we must remain cognizant that the 
threats continue to expand as prospective attackers develop new tools, discover 
previously unidentified vulnerabilities in our critical systems, and find additional 
motivations to attack our nation’s cyber-supported critical infrastructures.   
In recognition of the unknown challenges waiting in our nation’s future, additional 
research is required to support the development of adaptable policies scalable to the rapidly 
changing environment. A demonstrated through the literature review, the existing research 
into the threats against U.S. critical cyber infrastructure has generally focused on the two 
key areas of defensive security utilizing technology and offensive operations that identifies 
and eliminates the actors who seek to target our cyber systems. 
Possible avenues of valuable research may also include a review of emerging 
technologies that provide more adaptable defensive precautions through leveraging 
artificial intelligence. At some point, it is possible that the technology will supplant the 
need for human decisions and intervention that is often identified as the point of failure 
during a post-intrusion review. Another area of valuable research may include a review of 
successful cyber security efforts initiated by the private sector, how the need for those 
efforts was advertised within the corporate structure to gather support, and the way that 
those successes could be imitated or initiated throughout the government enterprise. 
Related to this topic, a comprehensive study of the cyber security efforts of other nations 
and whether those efforts could be employed with the U.S. could prove beneficial to 
policy makers. 
Finally, additional research regarding deterrence or game theory as it applies to 
low-level attackers; advanced/organized criminal actors, and nation-state supported cyber 
threats should be conducted to more thoroughly evaluate the effectiveness of offensive 
operations against attackers of different skill levels and motivations.  
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